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The government has identified the drinks industry as a key partner in preventing alcohol
problems and reducing levels of harm. This report examines how policy has developed as a
result.
The research considers the perspectives of various stakeholders, and sheds light on the
government’s approach to alcohol problems and the drinks industry. This plan was set out in
its Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England and the Public Health White Paper ‘Choosing
Health’, both published in 2004. This approach, which emphasised corporate social
responsibility within the industry, was heavily criticised in some quarters. Critics believed that
the government had delegated an important area of public policy to a powerful commercial
interest.
The report examines the nature of the drinks industry, its perspective on alcohol problems
and the formation and implementation of key elements of the government’s alcohol strategy. It
also looks at the industry’s previous involvement in education and research, its efforts to self-
regulate and the role of industry within partnerships. The author suggests ways to improve
regulation, self-regulation, industry activity in education, training and research, and
partnership working. There are also recommendations for future research into alcohol policy.
The research took the form of a literature review and semi-structured interviews with
representatives from the drinks industry, the professions, the voluntary sector, academics,
government and the public sector. It is of interest to anyone researching, developing or
implementing alcohol policy, and to those in the drinks industry, the NHS and the voluntary
sector.
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• The Government’s alcohol strategy identified
the drinks industry as a key partner in
tackling alcohol problems. Specific proposals
included local and national social
responsibility schemes with financial
contributions from the industry. This aroused
concern among those dealing with the
consequences of alcohol misuse who doubted
the willingness and ability of the industry to
develop effective self-regulatory systems or
to engage in genuine partnership working.
• The Government’s initial proposals changed
considerably following discussions with the
industry. At national level, a new industry-
wide social responsibility standards
document was produced. Although this set
out key principles, standards and good
practice, it did not supersede existing codes
and was not accompanied by new
mechanisms for monitoring, implementation
and accreditation. The standards document
also failed to address some of the
acknowledged weaknesses of self-regulation
in this field, such as fragmentation,
duplication, gaps and inconsistencies
between existing codes covering different
sectors and aspects of the industry.
Furthermore, it did not set out ways of
strengthening enforcement, extending
independent input into self-regulation or
improving public accountability.
• The industry strongly opposed proposals to
create new independent funds at local and
national level for tackling alcohol problems.
At national level, a compromise was reached,
which led to the reform of an existing
industry trust (the Drinkaware Trust) to give
it greater independence. At local level,
Government sought new statutory powers
for the police and local authorities to compel
the alcohol retailers to contribute to local
initiatives, in the form of alcohol disorder
zones (ADZs), which were strongly opposed
by the industry.
• The industry acknowledges that the
production and sale of alcoholic drinks
carries with it important social
responsibilities. Efforts to strengthen social
responsibility followed adverse media
coverage about binge drinking. Wider
commitments to corporate social
responsibility (CSR) across the business
sector also provided an impetus. The large
multinational drinks producers have played a
key role in promoting CSR within the drinks
industry. These businesses have been
motivated by the need to protect both brand
and corporate reputations. Retailers have also
been motivated by a concern for reputation.
However, there are differences in perspective
between and within different sectors of the
industry, which rarely become public.
• The industry’s response to alcohol problems
has so far depended heavily on the
willingness and ability of the larger
companies to lead a diverse and dynamic
industry. In future much will depend on, not
only their continued commitment, but on the
extension of social responsibility across the
industry as a whole.
• Competitive pressures within the industry
are strong and can operate against social
responsibility.
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• The industry is opposed to policies that seek
to control overall levels of alcohol
consumption. Its critics are concerned that it
can discredit and resist effective public health
interventions that it perceives as a threat to
profitability. They are worried about the
industry’s economic and political power, and
its influence over policy. They are particularly
critical of the Portman Group, which in their
view lacks independence. Critics urge that
both the educational and regulatory
functions of the Portman Group be
transferred to a body independent of the
industry. It is envisaged that most of the
Portman Group’s educational functions will
be transferred to the new Drinkaware Trust.
• Those outside the industry acknowledge that
it has a role to play in reducing alcohol
problems. However, many are sceptical about
the industry’s social responsibility initiatives.
Critics argue that it could do much more,
especially in changing marketing practices,
improving product development and
shaping the drinking environment.
• The drinks industry has supported
educational projects in the alcohol field. Critics
believe that, although education can form a
useful part of a broader strategy, it is relatively
ineffective on its own. Some respondents were
very critical of the industry’s role in education
and argued that it could do more to promote
responsible drinking.
• The industry has supported alcohol research.
Critics are concerned about the possible
manipulation of research agendas and project
findings by the industry. They pointed out
that research, particularly when funded by
the industry, must be governed in a way that
explicitly protects the independence of
researchers. It would appear that clearer
criteria for research governance in the alcohol
field are needed.
• Despite attempts to introduce national
industry-wide standards, the industry is
governed by a bewildering array of self-
regulatory systems, which vary considerably
in detail. Most are viewed by critics as
relatively weak, particularly in terms of
enforcement.
• Both industry and non-industry respondents
stated that more could be done to promote a
more effective system of co-regulation with
the alcohol industry. In particular, self-
regulation could be bolstered by clarifying
the legality of socially responsible practices.
• Respondents from both within and outside
the industry argued that training has a
crucial role to play in supporting both
statutory and self-regulation. Training should
be evidence-based and informed by research
on the impact of programmes on socially
responsible practice, self-regulation and law
enforcement.
• In the traditionally adversarial world of
alcohol politics, partnership with industry
can create tensions. On a positive note, the
industry can bring resources as well as
expertise (from the producers’ knowledge of
marketing and drinking patterns to the local
‘street knowledge’ of Pubwatch schemes). To
refuse to have any input from the industry
would cut off a potential source of resources
and expertise. To exclude it from
partnerships as a matter of principle would
be short-sighted.
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• The industry’s commercial objectives can
conflict with the public interest and this
limits what it is able to do in the context of
partnerships. The best way forward is to
establish a coherent framework, which
clarifies the scope and purpose of
partnerships and which protects weaker
participants and the public interest. This
might include a national alcohol forum
involving all stakeholders, including the
industry.
• The industry must be engaged where it
makes a genuine contribution to the
reduction of alcohol problems. One such area
is local retailing schemes, such as Pubwatch
and other locally based alcohol partnership
arrangements and projects. There is already
evidence from ‘flagship’ projects to suggest
that partnership with the industry can bring
benefits. However, there needs to be a
comprehensive review of the impact of such
schemes and widespread dissemination of
the lessons they hold, which could be
reflected in future guidance and monitoring
of partnership arrangements.
• There needs to be a full and open debate
about the role of the drinks industry in the
governance of alcohol, including
partnerships.
• Many topics merit further research including:
– an independent evaluation of the national
standards, the new Drinkaware Trust and
alcohol disorder zones, following
implementation
– an investigation of how the different parts
of the industry relate to each other on
social responsibility issues
– a study of the influence of the industry
within the policy process
– an examination of the facilitators and
barriers to socially responsible practice
within the drinks industry
– a comprehensive study of the impact of
alcohol education campaigns
– an investigation of different models of
research governance in the alcohol field
– an assessment of the impact of self-
regulation in specific fields, including
advertising, marketing and promotion,
the drinking environment, under-age
drinking and training
– an evaluation of training schemes and
how they contribute to self-regulation,
socially responsible practice and the
observation of legal provisions
– a comprehensive review of the impact of
partnership working at local level.

1The Government’s Alcohol Harm Reduction
Strategy for England (Cabinet Office, 2004), and
the subsequent White Paper on Public Health
(Cm. 6374, 2004), identified the drinks industry
as a key partner in tackling alcohol problems.
The industry was called upon to strengthen its
own standards and practices while contributing
financially to projects in the alcohol field.
Specific proposals included the establishment of
new ‘social responsibility’ schemes for the
industry at national and local level.
The prominence given to the industry
aroused concern, particularly among those
dealing with the consequences of alcohol misuse
(see Drummond, 2004; Alcohol Concern, 2005;
Room, 2005). Doubts were expressed about the
industry’s willingness and ability to develop
effective self-regulatory systems and to engage
in genuine partnership working. Critics
believed that the industry would not
countenance measures that threatened its
commercial objectives and that the Government
had, in effect, delegated an important area of
public policy to a powerful commercial lobby.
This report examines this crucial aspect of
the Government’s alcohol strategy and its early
implementation. Chapter 1 examines the nature
of the industry, its key institutions and
perspectives on alcohol-related harm. Chapter 2
explores the formation and implementation of
the elements of the Government’s alcohol
strategy that relate to the industry. Chapter 3
examines the industry’s involvement in
initiatives in the field of education and research.
Chapter 4 focuses on self-regulation within the
industry, while Chapter 5 considers the
activities of the industry within various
partnership arrangements.
The research took the form of a literature
search on industry initiatives in the alcohol
field, self-regulation and partnership working.
In addition, 25 semi-structured interviews were
undertaken during 2005 with participants from
the drinks industry, the voluntary sector,
professional organisations, academia,
Government and the public sector. (To maintain
confidentiality, interviewees’ contributions are
referenced in the text as follows: I1–14 for
industry respondents and N1–11 for non-
industry respondents – including government
personnel.) The researcher was also invited to
participate in and observe two stakeholder
meetings held by the Portman Group.
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2This chapter examines the nature of the
alcoholic drinks industry in the UK, its main
representative organisations and institutions on
alcohol policy issues, and its perspectives on
alcohol-related harm.
In 2004, the estimated value of the UK
alcoholic drinks market was over £40 billion,
around 6 per cent of consumer spending (see Key
Note, 2005). However, this economically
important industry has undergone many changes
in recent years. Production is concentrated in large
multinational corporations with interests across
the main types of alcoholic beverage: beer, spirits
and wine. These corporations, which include
Diageo, Scottish and Newcastle, and Pernod
Ricard, increasingly focus on heavily promoted
and advertised global brands. The rise of global
corporations and their brands has strengthened
both the market power and the political leverage
of these large producer companies. However,
several other developments have provided a
counterweight to this. Smaller, ‘niche-market’
producers have emerged, focusing on specific
sectors of the market (such as ‘designer drinks’).
There have also been important structural changes
in the retail sector, such as the transfer of most
brewery-owned pubs to new independent retail
operators known as ‘pubcos’. Other important
trends have been the increase in supermarket sales
of alcohol and the growing numbers of
entertainment establishments associated with the
new night-time economy.
Representing the industry
The industry is represented by several trade
associations. These include the British Beer and
Pub Association (BBPA), which represents over
half of all pubs and all the large brewers. It is
regarded as an effective trade association and, in
the words of one informant (N11), ‘is a strong
negotiator on the industry’s behalf’. In recent
years, the BBPA’s profile has grown in relation
to social responsibility issues, particularly with
the development of the code on point of sale
promotions (discussed in Chapter 4). Other
associations involved in social responsibility
issues include the Scotch Whisky Association
(SWA), the Wine and Spirits Association (WSA),
the Association of Convenience Stores (ACS),
the British Retail Consortium (BRC), the
Association of Multiple Retailers (AMR), the Bar
Entertainment and Dance Association (BEDA),
the British Institute of Innkeeping (BII) and the
Advertising Association.
The Portman Group
The key industry organisation on alcohol
misuse issues is the Portman Group, formed in
1989 by the leading drinks producers to bring
together various ‘social responsibility’
initiatives. Although retailers may join the
Portman Group as associate members, and
indeed provide a small part of its funding,
producers continue to dominate both its
funding and governance. The Portman Group
has a number of roles. It operates a self-
regulatory scheme for alcohol producers on the
marketing, packaging and promotion of
alcoholic drinks (see Chapter 4). It also currently
funds various educational initiatives to promote
responsible drinking and to reduce alcohol-
related harm (see Chapter 3), though most of
this activity will be superseded by the
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Government’s plans for an independent
national fund (see Chapter 2).
The industry respondents interviewed for
this study argued that the Portman Group has a
considerable amount of independence. In the
words of one, it could be ‘tough on its
paymasters’ (I7). Internal criticisms were minor,
mainly about governance arrangements, notably
from retailers who thought the organisation was
too closely tied to large producer interests. Some
industry informants stated that the Portman
Group could do more to include non-industry
stakeholders. Indeed, a stakeholder group was
established during the period covered by this
research (including academics, civil servants,
alcohol charities, health professionals and youth
organisations).
Non-industry respondents were far more
critical. They saw the Portman Group as a
powerful public relations body and lobbyist for
the industry. Critics argued that there was
conflict between its roles of ‘industry
watchdog’, ‘alcohol misuse prevention body’
and ‘representative of the industry’. They
maintained that the Portman Group lacked
independence and would inevitably reflect the
interests of its funders by, for example, ignoring
or discrediting evidence that did not fit with the
industry’s perspective on the causes of alcohol
misuse. There was also criticism of its
educational and information campaigns for
placing too much emphasis on the responsibility
of individual consumers and for not sufficiently
highlighting the long-term risks of heavy
drinking (see Chapter 3). Added to this was
wider concern about the influence of the
Portman Group over alcohol research, which
followed the decision to appoint its then chief
executive to the Alcohol Education and
Research Council (AERC) – discussed further in
Chapter 3.
Indeed, the Portman Group was portrayed
by these respondents in a similar light to other
‘social aspects organisations’ (SAOs) funded by
the industry. SAOs exist within various
countries and also operate at the European and
international level (for example, the Amsterdam
Group and the International Center for Alcohol
Policies – ICAP). Elsewhere, critics of the
industry have concluded that the main aim of
SAOs is to manage issues that are potentially
detrimental to the alcohol business (Babor, 2000;
Eurocare, 2003).
The Portman Group strenuously denies that
it is a lobbyist for the industry. Its former chief
executive has stated that:
… the Portman Group is not a trade association or
a lobby group. It does not represent the industry.
It has no commercial purpose. Its role is to
promote responsible drinking by the consumer
and responsible marketing by producers.
(Coussins, 2004)
Even so, non-industry respondents argued
that a lack of transparency undermined the
credibility of the Portman Group and of the
alcohol industry as a whole. The majority of
non-industry people who were interviewed
favoured transferring the Portman Group’s
educational functions and regulatory roles to a
body with visible independence from the
industry.
The industry’s perspectives on alcohol
problems
The industry acknowledges that a range of
individual and social problems are associated
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with alcohol. However, it views these as a
consequence of misuse by a minority of the
population. Furthermore, the industry focuses
on causal factors pertaining to the individual or
particular ‘high-risk’ population groups, rather
than on social or environmental influences on
the population as a whole. It follows that the
interventions endorsed by the industry are
those that target individuals and population
subgroups, including education, biomedical and
psychosocial research, support and treatment
for those with alcohol problems. The industry
rejects policies that target whole populations,
particularly those that seek to control overall
alcohol-consumption levels, despite evidence of
their potential effectiveness in reducing alcohol
problems (Babor et al., 2003; Academy of
Medical Sciences, 2004; Room et al., 2005). But
the industry does accept that its practices can
impact on factors such as the drinking
environment and culture. Indeed, it maintains it
has always acknowledged that its products are
capable of being misused and claims to have
pursued a socially responsible approach for
many years. More recently, heightened
awareness of corporate social responsibility
(CSR) across the wider business sector has
forced the industry to be more explicit in setting
out its position.
Corporate image and reputation
The key principle of CSR is that modern
corporations will thrive, not by being narrow
and self-interested, but by being good corporate
citizens. Advocates of CSR argue that projects
benefiting the public along with voluntary
efforts to reduce external costs imposed by
corporations on society can have a positive
effect on the enterprise, by creating a better
environment for business, new markets and
improved relationships with consumers and
employees (see Grayson and Hodges, 2004).
Although critics of CSR are correct in
identifying its limits within the corporate
entities that predominate today (see Bakan,
2005), there are situations where the profit
motive may be compatible with greater social
responsibility. In the drinks industry, the large
multinationals seem particularly concerned that
the brands in which they have heavily invested
may attract adverse publicity linked to alcohol
problems. When asked about the motivation for
social responsibility, one respondent from a
large producer replied ‘we don’t want our
brands brought down’ (I11), while another said
it was ‘driven primarily by pride and
professionalism in our products. The company
wants to take care of its brands’ (I13) (see also
Grant and O’Connor, 2005). The large producers
are also anxious that the activities of other
producers (and also some retailers) may damage
the reputation of the industry as a whole.
Indeed, as one industry respondent put it, ‘there
is now a free-trade mentality with many small
operators, the old authority structures have
gone’ (I11).
A concern for reputation is not confined to
the large producers. An interviewee from a
pubco stated that its policy on social
responsibility emerged from ‘a concern for
reputation’ and ‘the prospect of having the
corporate name dragged into bad publicity
about alcohol’ (I14), while a spokesperson from
a retail trade association observed that:
The drinks industry is anxious about its image. It
is not just worried about the consequences of
this in terms of government intervention. It is also
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concerned about the public, shareholder and
investor confidence in the industry. The public
image of the industry is very important.
(I8)
Recent social responsibility initiatives have
been triggered by bad publicity surrounding
alcohol problems – and in particular binge
drinking. Industry respondents argued that the
media exaggerated these problems. Indeed, one
respondent (I14) stated that some landlords had
banned from their premises copies of the Daily
Mail and Mail on Sunday because of their
hostility towards the industry. Yet it was the
extensive and negative media coverage on
alcohol that forced the Government to take a
much tougher line with the industry. Notably,
the Government’s alcohol strategy (see Chapter
2) had threatened further intervention if the
industry did not respond accordingly.
Interviewees seemed convinced that this was a
genuine threat that created a powerful incentive
for the industry to act.
Competitive pressures also played an
important part in shaping the industry’s views.
The large operators stated in interview that they
wanted to protect their brands, not only from
adverse publicity, but also from opportunistic
new entrants. The industry interviewees – all
from larger companies and established trade
associations – were scathing about the
‘cowboys’ who could ruin the industry’s
reputation. These included ‘rogue landlords’
and ‘get-rich-quick’ producers and retailers who
had no long-term commitment to the industry
but wanted to make a ‘fast buck’.
In other circumstances, however, it may suit
large corporations to turn a blind eye to the
operations of ‘rogue’ companies if their
products and practices offer potential future
gains for all, as suggested by one non-industry
interviewee:
What seems to have happened is that the ‘bad
boys’ have ‘slashed and burned’, carving out new
markets and developing new products, with new
approaches to marketing and promotion. Larger
companies have watched them and condemn
their practices when they attract criticism from
media or Government. But they also have the
option of developing similar products if they feel it
is commercially viable.
(N2)
Fragmentation and leadership
There are clearly limits to social responsibility.
One limiting factor, noted by both industry and
non-industry observers, is the dynamic and
diverse nature of the industry (see also Social
Market Foundation, 2006, pp. 30–3). Although
the industry is adept at producing a common
front, it does disagree in private. Each drinks
sector has its own traditions and representative
institutions. There is a tendency to blame and
criticise other sectors for the problem. Hence,
producers tend to complain about poor retail
practices, pub landlords blame off-licences for
under-age sales and cheap alcohol, and off-
licence proprietors see binge drinking as chiefly
a problem for pubs and bars. However, some
industry respondents in this study believed that
the rivalry and tensions between the different
parts of the trade were exaggerated, and that
each sector now had much in common in
tackling alcohol problems.
The involvement of large producer
companies in social responsibility initiatives has
helped to offset the effects of fragmentation.
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Most interviewees (from both within and
outside the industry) acknowledged that the
large multinational companies were at the
forefront of efforts to improve standards. From
an industry perspective, the Portman Group
was seen as an integrating force, though its
domination by producers undermined its
legitimacy as the voice of the industry as a
whole. Another integrating factor is that various
companies, trade associations and other
industry bodies are linked by overlapping
memberships, and key industry figures sit on
several important committees. Furthermore, the
major companies, trade associations and the
Portman Group are in regular contact with each
other on issues of common interest.
Although there is leadership in the industry,
interviewees from within and outside it stressed
the importance of a continued commitment by
the large producers and trade bodies to tackling
alcohol problems. Furthermore, they said it was
imperative that social responsibility extends
throughout the whole industry.
Although there are internal debates, open
disagreements are extremely rare. It is relatively
unusual for one company or sector of the
industry to ‘break cover’, for example by taking
additional steps that might pressure others to
do more. However, this does occasionally
happen, as the following two examples
illustrate. When Diageo hosted a conference on
alcohol misuse, organised by the Institute for
Public Policy Research (IPPR), at which the
Prime Minister Tony Blair made a speech about
the urgent need to tackle binge drinking, some
within the industry were reportedly furious
(Finch, 2004, p. 31). When, on another occasion,
the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA)
introduced financial penalties for breaches of its
advertising and marketing code of practice (see
Chapter 4), others within the alcohol industry
were critical, believing that this set a dangerous
precedent for other codes.
Criticism of the industry’s efforts
Critics of the industry acknowledged that it was
concerned about its public image. They also
realised that in some circumstances it was
profitable for the industry to be socially
responsible. For example, by increasing the
amount of food served in licensed premises, the
industry could increase profits and contribute to
a reduction in alcohol problems, such as
disorder. Moreover, in certain circumstances,
producer and retailers could increase profits by
raising prices, which could reduce excessive
consumption. However, the contemporary
drinks market was seen as pulling in the
opposite direction. Reduced margins and
increasing numbers of outlets tended to drive
prices down, increasing both consumption and
alcohol problems. Given these pressures, critics
doubted the industry’s commitment to social
responsibility. According to one, for example:
CSR … enables the companies to dispel
suspicions, appear caring and satisfy shareholders
that it is dealing with the long-term potential
threats to its business such as anti-industry
campaigns and increased government regulation.
(N9)
The broad sentiment from critics was that
CSR was ‘tokenism’. Some felt that the industry
was adopting a minimal approach, others saw it
as an attempt to pass the blame. As one
respondent observed: ‘the trade tends to blame
everyone else for the problem. Yet it has helped
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create the conditions for today’s problem’ (N5).
Another noted that the industry had lobbied
successfully for longer licensing hours in
England and Wales, and against safeguards that
might have reduced the potential for disorder –
such as statutory controls on the number of
outlets in areas that were already ‘saturated’
(N10) and the designation of public health as a
licensing objective.
Critics felt that the drinks industry could do
much more to improve the drinking culture
through product development and marketing,
in particular through the development of low-
and non-alcoholic drinks. One commented that
‘the drinks industry has done much to create the
drinking culture we have through its marketing
activities’ (N9). Another identified the impact of
senior management on the cultural environment
of its employees, in particular the impact of
demanding sales targets, noting that ‘some
companies are very ruthless in setting sales
targets for their retail managers. This creates
incentives to engage in irresponsible promotions
such as Happy Hours’ (N1). With regard to this
latter point, an exposé in The Observer in
October 2005 uncovered:
… a ruthless campaign of economic incentives
and psychological tricks to get customers to drink
as much as possible when licensing laws are
relaxed.
(Hinsliff and Asthana, 2005, pp. 1–2)
The non-industry respondents were critical
of the industry’s perspective on alcohol
problems. One said she was surprised ‘how
little senior people in the industry understand
about alcohol problems’ (N3). Others saw this as
deliberate ignorance; in the words of one, the
‘industry won’t accept the evidence’ (N9). The
body of public health evidence was seen as a
particular threat to the industry because it
provided strong arguments for control policies.
Above all, critics were concerned about the
industry’s economic and political power. They
felt the Government’s Alcohol Harm Reduction
Strategy had been strongly influenced by the
industry. This was summed up neatly by one
respondent:
The industry proved to be very influential during
the review of alcohol strategy. Initially, before the
politicians really got involved, much was left to
the civil servants and an expert group. Problems
began when the politicians got involved. Industry
lobbied them behind the scenes about their
concerns regarding the strategy. The strategy
then began to move away from the evidence
base and more aligned with the industry’s
perspectives.
(N11)
Conclusions
• The industry acknowledges that the
production and sale of alcoholic drinks
carries with it important social
responsibilities. Efforts to strengthen social
responsibility followed adverse media
coverage about binge drinking. Wider
commitments to corporate social
responsibility (CSR) across the business
sector were also important. The large
multinational drinks producers have played a
key role in promoting CSR within the drinks
industry. These businesses have been
motivated by the need to protect both brand
and corporate reputations. Retailers were also
motivated by a concern for reputation.
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However, there are differences in perspective
between and within different sectors of the
industry, which rarely become public.
• The industry’s response to alcohol problems
has so far depended heavily on the
willingness and ability of the larger
companies to lead a diverse and dynamic
industry. In future much will depend, not
only on their continued commitment, but
also on the extension of social responsibility
across the industry as a whole.
• Competitive pressures within the industry
are strong and can operate against social
responsibility.
• The industry is opposed to policies that seek
to control overall levels of alcohol
consumption. Its critics are concerned that it
can discredit and resist effective public health
interventions that it perceives as a threat to
profitability. They are worried about the
industry’s economic and political power, and
its influence over policy. They are particularly
critical of the Portman Group, which in their
view lacks independence. Critics urge that
the educational and regulatory functions of
the Portman Group be transferred to a body
independent of the industry.
• Those outside the industry acknowledge that
it has a role to play in reducing alcohol
problems. However, many are sceptical about
the industry’s social responsibility initiatives.
Critics argue that it could do much more,
especially in changing marketing practices,
improving product development and
shaping the drinking environment.
• Further research should include an
examination of the facilitators and barriers to
socially responsible practice within the
contemporary drinks industry. There is also
scope for an investigation of the relationships
between the different sectors of the industry
on social responsibility issues, in particular
between the on- and off-trade, and between
the traditional producer enterprises and ‘new
entrants’. In addition, a study of the influence
of the drinks industry within the policy
process, including its relationships with
Government, Parliament and the media,
would be timely.
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This chapter examines the Government’s
proposals to establish national and local social
responsibility schemes for the drinks industry,
and its subsequent decision to introduce alcohol
disorder zones at local level.
National social responsibility scheme
One of the key proposals in the Government’s
Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy was a
tripartite national social responsibility scheme
for drinks producers covering: the promotion of
good practice in product development,
branding, advertising and packaging; donations
to an independent fund for alcohol projects; and
promotion of good practice down the supply
chain. However, following discussions with the
industry, important changes were made. The
independent fund proposal upset the industry
and was temporarily put to one side. The
remaining elements were fed into the
production of a single document, Social
Responsibility Standards for the Production and Sale
of Alcoholic Drinks in the UK, published in
November 2005 (hereafter known as the
‘national standards’). This represented an
attempt to persuade the whole industry to
explicitly endorse key principles, standards and
good practice.
However, the industry was adamant that the
national standards would not replace existing
codes, which governed specific aspects and
sectors of the industry (such as advertising
standards, point of sale promotions in pubs and
bars, marketing and packaging, nightclub
venues, the Scotch Whisky industry and so on –
see Chapter 4). Arguments about how to resolve
differences between the various codes led to
delays in the production of the national
standards document. Further delays resulted
from the dissatisfaction by Government with the
draft document. The Home Office called for
stronger and more explicit statements,
particularly on issues such as under-age drinking
and drunkenness. According to industry sources,
delay was also caused by differences in
perspective and poor co-ordination between the
main government departments involved in
alcohol policy (in particular the Home Office,
Department of Health and the Department for
Culture, Media and Sport).
The Government heralded the national
standards document as a worthwhile exercise in
setting ‘aspirational’ standards and achieving
collaboration between all the major industry
associations (and their member companies). The
document included new industry-wide
commitments to sensible drinking messages,
display of alcohol content, training, and
controlled exit and dispersal from licensed
premises, while reiterating existing standards
on advertising, marketing and promotion,
under-age sales and serving to intoxicated
persons. Although the industry representatives
who were interviewed were pleased with the
national standards document, they were
worried that the Government would overstate
its importance. For example, one industry
insider, while welcoming the national
standards, warned that the document was
‘incredibly complicated, unenforceable and
gimmicky’ (I2). Another pointed out that ‘we
are slightly unclear about what the Government
will be measuring the industry against’ (I12).
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Those from outside the industry agreed that
the development of industry-wide standards
provided both a statement of intent and a
framework for the development of good
practice. But they expressed doubts about
monitoring, implementation and enforcement,
noting that the document did not set clear
targets or benchmarks against which the
industry’s efforts could be judged. They were
also disappointed that the national standards
did not promote the rationalisation or reform of
existing sector-specific codes and therefore did
not address the problems of fragmentation,
duplication, gaps and inconsistencies that arose
(see Chapter 4). Concerns were also expressed
about the absence of an independent scrutiny
and weak public accountability of the scheme.
In addition, the national standards document
lacked key elements mentioned in the original
alcohol strategy, including means of spreading
best practice, advising businesses that sought
accreditation under the scheme, promoting the
scheme and managing accreditation. There was
no mention of an independent board to run the
scheme, as in the original proposal.
At the time of writing, discussions continue
about how to implement the national standards
and monitor the performance of the industry
against them. Some parts of the industry
already have an internal review of performance,
such as the Portman Group’s audit of its
‘commitment to action agreement’, discussed in
Chapter 4. It is possible that this ‘self-audit’
approach could be rolled out across the
industry, tailored to the specific needs of each
sector.
Meanwhile, the Government’s proposed
evaluation of the national standards scheme,
mentioned in the original alcohol strategy
document, has yet to be clarified and it remains
uncertain whether this will now take the form of
an external review by an independent body or
‘self-evaluation’ by the industry itself. The
timing of any evaluation is also unclear,
although the alcohol strategy originally
proposed a review early in the next Parliament
(i.e. the current Parliament, elected in 2005).
The independent national fund
The alcohol strategy proposed a new national
fund, with donations from industry, to finance
projects to tackle alcohol-related harm. It was
envisaged that this fund would be administered
by an independent board with representatives
from Government, industry, the voluntary
sector, the health service and the community.
This worried the industry, not least the
industry-funded Portman Group (see Chapter
1). Some respondents argued that the
establishment of a national fund would, in
effect, nationalise the Portman Group. Others
said that it would undermine or duplicate its
efforts (and possibly other bodies, such as the
Alcohol Education and Research Council –
AERC – discussed in Chapter 3). Industry
insiders argued that an independent fund was
unnecessary because – in their eyes – the
Portman Group was already sufficiently
independent. The industry viewed the
Government’s response as a rather underhand
way of increasing its contribution to social
responsibility projects. According to one
respondent, the industry ‘was implacably
opposed’ to the proposal and had told the
Government that, if it wanted a national fund, it
would have to legislate.
Those outside the industry endorsed an
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independent national fund to replace the
Portman Group. They argued that the industry
should not participate in the allocation of funds
to projects. However, some agreed that the
industry should be included in advisory
structures along with other stakeholders. This
would enable it to contribute to debates about
priorities, but not dictate them. The key
problem identified by non-industry respondents
was how to separate the raising of funds from
their allocation. Suggestions included a ‘blind
levy’ on drinks companies, or an additional tax
on alcohol, channelled through an independent
body.
The Government decided against a new non-
departmental body to administer the
independent fund. (To have done so would
have been at odds with its policy of reducing
the number of ‘arm’s-length’ public bodies.)
Instead, it backed a proposal from the industry
to separate the Portman Group’s regulatory and
educational roles. It was proposed that the latter
would be transferred to a new trust based on
the Portman Group’s charitable arm, the
Drinkaware Trust (see Chapter 3). Following
months of deliberation between Government,
the industry and other stakeholders (including
alcohol agencies and health professionals), a
memorandum of understanding was agreed in
June 2006. This established a new trust (which
for the time being will retain the ‘Drinkaware’
name). The trust will be run by 13 trustees (five
from industry, five non-industry alcohol
stakeholders, two lay people with no
professional interest in alcohol and an
independent chair). These will be appointed by
a panel consisting of government, industry and
non-industry representatives. The trust will be
funded by industry, initially from Portman
Group member companies but with a
commitment to encourage the wider industry to
invest in the fund. According to industry
insiders, suggestions for a turnover-based levy
on all drinks producers and retailers were
vetoed, largely because of opposition from the
retail trade, particularly the large supermarkets.
The Drinkaware Trust will be formally
separated from the Portman Group and will
have a new chief executive, though it may
employ current Drinkaware Trust staff, subject
to a review of staffing needs. The trust was
given three key objectives: to increase awareness
of safe and responsible drinking, and the impact
of alcohol misuse on society and individuals; to
improve attitudes towards safe and responsible
drinking and the unacceptability of binge
drinking; and to effect positive changes in
behaviour related to alcohol consumption. The
trust’s performance against these objectives will
be independently audited within three years of
its creation. A number of principles
underpinning the trust’s work were also set out
in the memorandum of agreement, including
that the trust should act in the interests of the
public and undertake programmes that are
evidence-based.
Local schemes
The Government’s Alcohol Harm Reduction
Strategy proposed a code of good practice for
retailers, along with local funds to combat
alcohol misuse. It was intended that local codes
would be shaped by a national framework
drawn up by the industry and Government,
which would include commitments to: tackle
under-age drinking and set out proof of age
requirements; impose guidelines on
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irresponsible promotions; encourage the display
of sensible drinking messages; and outline
minimum staff training requirements.
In the event, separate codes were devised by
on- and off-licence retail sectors. Retail issues
were also incorporated in the national standards
document mentioned earlier. The national
standards document does not, however, give
any indication about how these elements will be
implemented at local level. This is in contrast to
the proposals in the alcohol strategy, which
suggested that a form of accreditation would be
introduced and that adherence to local codes
would be taken into account when official
complaints were made against particular
premises. Accreditation, it appears, has been
discarded as a means of recognising good
practice (see Social Market Foundation, 2006).
The alcohol strategy also stated that take-up of
the code at local level would be assessed as part
of the proposed review of the social
responsibility scheme. So far there has been no
indication of when, or how, this will be done.
The alcohol strategy also proposed financial
contributions from the industry towards
managing crime and disorder, subject to a
consultation process. The idea was that the
industry would pay into a local fund, collected
and managed by local authorities. Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and
local communities would then decide how the
funds would be used to tackle alcohol problems.
This might include additional community
support officers or late-night transport services.
This aspect of the policy shifted considerably
during 2005 in the face of opposition by retailers
to new local funds (Social Market Foundation,
2006, p. 10) and the Government’s proposals for
alcohol disorder zones.
Alcohol disorder zones
Further concern about binge drinking and
alcohol-related crime and disorder led the
Government to issue a new consultation paper
(DCMS et al., 2005) containing plans for alcohol
disorder zones (ADZs), alongside more powers
for police to tackle under-age drinking and
disorderly premises. Legislation was brought
forward during 2005 in the form of the Violent
Crime Reduction Bill, which at the time of
writing is completing its final parliamentary
stages.
ADZs were proposed as a means by which
local authorities and the police could promote
action on alcohol problems, such as nuisance or
disorder. Licensed premises in problem areas
will have eight weeks to implement an action
plan prepared by the local authority and chief of
police. Failure to comply will lead to the
designation of an ADZ, which will force
licensed premises to contribute financially to the
cost of managing and reducing the area’s
alcohol-related problems.
The drinks industry respondents in this
study were scathing about ADZs, one
describing the idea as ‘wacky and crass’ (I4) and
another as ‘upside down, back to front and
wrong-headed’ (I8). They believed that ADZs
heralded a more adversarial and confrontational
approach by the Government, and argued that
the policy was unfair to well-managed
premises. Critics maintained that ADZs failed to
take into account that the causes of alcohol
misuse might lie outside the designated zone –
for example, excessive drinking could take place
at home or in other establishments prior to any
disorder. They also argued such zones could
stigmatise the designated areas and might
actually make disorder worse by attracting
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hooligan elements. Furthermore, the zones
could have adverse effects on businesses in the
area by discouraging well-behaved customers. It
was argued that ADZs could remove the
incentive for businesses to undertake voluntary,
partnership and self-regulatory activities to
reduce alcohol problems. Finally, critics
maintained that there was no clear relationship
between resources raised and spending on
alcohol-related initiatives because the funds
were not ring-fenced.
Some non-industry respondents shared these
concerns, notably with regard to possible stigma
associated with ADZs, the failure to ring-fence
funds and unfairness to well-managed outlets.
In addition, there were fears that the proposals
might be unworkable or could be vulnerable to
legal challenge both in relation to practice (on
the grounds for designation, for example) and
on principle (enforced contributions from
premises not promoting disorder). The lack of
detail about how the scheme would actually
work in practice was heavily criticised. The
broad sentiment expressed by these respondents
was that the ADZ proposals were ‘a stopgap’
(N5) or a ‘piecemeal intervention’ (N3), which
would do little to prevent alcohol problems.
From the Government’s perspective, this
policy reflected a manifesto commitment on
alcohol-related disorder and violence (Labour
Party, 2005), which arose both from sustained
media pressure on the binge drinking issue and
from the reluctance of the industry to contribute
to the local funds identified in the Alcohol
Harm Reduction Strategy. Ministers also
claimed that ADZs would be used only as a last
resort, where voluntary co-operation with the
industry was not forthcoming.
Conclusions
• The Government’s initial proposals changed
considerably following discussions with the
industry. At national level, a new industry-
wide social responsibility standards
document was produced. Although this set
out key principles, standards and good
practice, it did not supersede existing codes.
It was not accompanied by new mechanisms
for monitoring, implementation and
accreditation. The standards document also
failed to address some of the acknowledged
weaknesses of self-regulation in this field,
such as fragmentation, duplication, gaps and
inconsistencies between existing codes
covering different sectors and aspects of the
industry. Furthermore, it did not set out ways
of strengthening enforcement, extending
independent input into self-regulation or
improving public accountability.
• The industry strongly opposed proposals to
create new independent funds at local and
national level for tackling alcohol problems.
At national level, a compromise was reached,
which led to the reform of an existing
industry trust (the Drinkaware Trust) to give
it greater independence. At local level,
Government sought new statutory powers
for the police and local authorities to compel
the alcohol retailers to contribute to local
initiatives, in the form of ADZs, which were
strongly opposed by the industry.
• Further research must include an
independent evaluation of the impact of the
national standards, the new Drinkaware
Trust and, when implemented, ADZs.
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There are many possible ways of preventing
alcohol problems. For reasons explored in the
previous chapter, the drink industry favours
those that focus on individuals or groups of
people, rather than population-wide
approaches. It also prefers interventions that
seek to educate or inform people about alcohol
problems rather than restrictions on the
industry or its customers. Education (including
the provision of public information) and certain
research activities tend to score highly on both
criteria and are therefore strongly favoured by
the industry. This chapter examines the
involvement of industry in sponsoring activities
in education and research, and considers the
views of those critical of the industry’s role in
these areas.
Education
During the late 1970s, heightened concern about
alcohol problems in general, and drink-driving
and under-age drinking in particular, led the
industry to extend its efforts to educate and
inform the public. Although individual
companies and trade associations had
previously undertaken public information
campaigns – on drink-driving, for example – the
industry began to engage in a more collective
effort. A number of high-profile industry
projects were subsequently launched, including
the ‘Wheelwatch’ and ‘Agewatch’ campaigns,
aimed at drink-driving and under-age drinking
respectively.
In the 1990s, many of the industry’s
educational initiatives were taken up and
extended by the Portman Group, which
undertook a range of activities including the ‘I’ll
be Des’ campaign, aimed at deterring drinking
and driving, and the provision of educational
materials for use in schools and colleges.
Meanwhile, individual companies continued to
sponsor educational activities and in some cases
ran their own information campaigns. More
recently, companies have included education
messages in their own sponsorship and
advertising (see below).
Although drink-driving and under-age
drinking remain important areas of activity, the
industry has moved beyond these to address
issues of drunkenness and binge drinking.
Examples include the Portman Group’s ‘Don’t
do drunk’ campaign (launched in 2001) and,
more recently, the Diageo TV advertisements
(‘Many me’ and ‘Mirror’, screened from
February 2006). Other initiatives to disseminate
information on responsible drinking include
activities under the aegis of the Drinkaware
Trust (the Portman Group’s charitable arm,
which is currently in the process of being
restructured as a semi-independent body – see
Chapter 2). These include: the Drinkaware.co.uk
website, which carries information on
responsible drinking; various educational
materials for parents and schools; and other
resources including ‘unit calculators’, which
enable people to estimate the number of units of
alcohol consumed from a range of standard
drinks.
Notwithstanding these various
developments, there remains much scepticism
about the industry’s motives and activities. One
non-industry interviewee in this study argued
that the Portman Group’s activities were ‘one-
3 Industry initiatives in education and
research
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off initiatives that lacked overall coherence’
(N3). Other respondents expressed fears about
the industry controlling funds for education
campaigns, particularly with regard to school-
based education. Indeed, among those in the
public health arena, there is an underlying
scepticism about the impact of educational
interventions on alcohol problems. Education is
seen as part of the armoury of policy
instruments that can, in conjunction with others,
reduce harm, but is regarded as relatively
ineffective on its own (see Babor et al., 2003).
The alcohol strategy includes a commitment
to work with industry to include sensible
drinking messages on products alongside
information about unit content. The Portman
Group has encouraged member companies to
support the principle of unit labelling and to use
consumer brand advertising or sponsored
events to promote responsibility messages. Unit
labelling on alcohol products and packaging is
now widespread. In addition, drinks companies
and retailers are placing messages on their
products, including the official ‘sensible
drinking’ guidelines of a maximum three to four
units per day for men and two to three units for
women, as well as ‘warning messages’ such as
‘enjoy your alcohol responsibly’, ‘drink in
moderation’, ‘excessive drinking can cause
harm’ or ‘don’t drink and drive’. Sensible
drinking messages are also appearing on
advertising and promotion materials (for
example, TV, press and cinema advertisements)
and at sponsored events. For example, drinks
company sponsorship of the Ashes in 2006 and
the British Grand Prix was accompanied by
responsible drinking and anti-drink-driving
messages. Sensible drinking messages are also
found at point of sale; Waitrose, for example,
displays sensible drinking limits on its shelves.
More generally, products and marketing
materials increasingly carry references to the
Drinkaware.co.uk website.
Some non-industry respondents were
sceptical about unit labelling and sensible
drinking messages on products and in
marketing. Even an industry source admitted
that ‘health warnings don’t really do any good’
(I7). There is little evidence to suggest that such
messages alone have an impact on drinking
behaviour (see Andrews, 1995; Grube and
Nygaard, 2001; Agostinelli and Grube, 2002).
Also, the reliance on self-regulation means that
the messages will probably remain fairly weak.
Stronger warnings will probably require direct
intervention, as the industry is opposed to
placing ‘official warnings’ on their products and
in their marketing.
Research
The drinks industry has a long history of
funding research into alcohol problems. By the
late 1980s, it estimated that it spent around
£0.5m per annum on research. Also, it
supported the establishment of the Alcohol
Education and Research Council (AERC) in
1981, which still exists today. This organisation
allocates grants for research and for the
development of capacity (of people and
organisations) to address alcohol issues. Its
budget is derived from capital raised from an
obsolete drinks industry compensation fund
(see Baggott, 1990).
In the 20 or so years after its creation, the
AERC avoided controversy. Despite wider
concerns about industry involvement in
research (see below), the fact that the AERC
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administered funds derived from the industry,
and had a ruling council that contained industry
nominees, attracted little attention. However,
the appointment of Jean Coussins, then the
Portman Group’s chief executive, to the board of
AERC produced a strong reaction from senior
figures in the alcohol research community (see
Edwards et al., 2004), who argued that this gave
the industry undue influence over research
priorities and decisions. In their view, the
Portman Group had:
… consistently propagated interpretations of the
research evidence that promote the commercial
interests of the drinks industry while seeking to
discredit research findings that would lead to
effective policy measures supporting the
interests of public health.
(Edwards et al., 2004; see also Mayor, 2004)
Coussins (2004) vigorously denied that the
Portman Group was a lobbyist for the industry
and argued that it was perfectly legitimate for
her to take up the appointment.
In the face of this controversy, DCMS (the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport,
which currently has overall responsibility for
AERC) commissioned a review, which found no
impropriety in Coussins’ appointment (DCMS,
2006). However, the review did recommend
possible options for future engagement with
industry, which included a continuation of the
practice of nominated members, subject to
judgements about suitability, and the
establishment of formal methods of consulting
with the industry. The review also
recommended that the ruling council be smaller
and appointed by the relevant sponsoring
department (which should in future be the
Department of Health rather than DCMS) in
accordance with the OCPA (Office of the
Commissioner for Public Appointments) rules.
Furthermore, it recommended that the AERC
consider external validation for the
management of future conflicts of interest.
Meanwhile, the industry continues to fund
research through other channels. For example,
the BBPA has earmarked £6 million for medical
and scientific research. Drinks companies and
trade bodies also allocate money to research
bodies, such as the European Research Advisory
Board (ERAB), which distributes funds for
biomedical and psychosocial research into beer
or alcohol. This body is administered by a
board, which includes drink industry personnel.
Grant applications are independently externally
peer reviewed, and overseen by an advisory
board of doctors and academics.
Interviewees from the industry were proud
of their involvement with various research
initiatives. Their enthusiasm was not matched
by non-industry observers, several of whom
expressed concern that industry funding could
facilitate the manipulation of research agendas
and project findings. According to one, for
example, ‘the drinks industry is always seeking
to use and manipulate. Academics must be on
their guard’ (N7). The same respondent
revealed that a senior executive from a drinks
company had once tried to persuade him to
publicly endorse the industry’s perspective on
alcohol problems, offering in return a large
donation to a charity of his choice. In this
context, it should be remembered that, over a
decade ago, a number of academics were
allegedly offered £2,000 each by the industry to
criticise a report that had called for a stronger
‘public health’ approach to alcohol problems
(Doyle, 1994, p. 1).
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These may be extreme cases, but they do
highlight the need for clearer rules of
engagement. In an effort to clarify the industry’s
relationship with researchers, various principles
of co-operation on alcohol research among
industry, Government and the scientific and
academic communities have been set out. These
are part of the ‘Dublin Principles’ established at
a meeting of scientists, researchers and industry
representatives under the auspices of the
National College of Ireland (1997) and the
industry-funded International Center for
Alcohol Policies (ICAP – see Chapter 2). These
principles include: a commitment to
independent scientific research; high ethical
standards in the conduct and reporting of
research, irrespective of the source of funding;
avoidance of arrangements that compromise the
integrity and freedom of inquiry of researchers;
disclosure by researchers of conflict of interests
and sources of funding; and free dissemination
of results (subject to reasonable ethical
restrictions and commercial confidentiality).
These principles seem reasonable, though
they need to be more widely owned. They are
also very general and as such are open to wide
interpretation. A step forward from these
principles would be to establish clear criteria for
research governance in alcohol, to protect
researchers from any allegations of undue
influence over research agendas and findings,
especially where funding is derived from
industry sources.
Conclusions
• The drinks industry has supported
educational projects in the alcohol field.
Critics believe that, although education can
form a useful part of a broader strategy, it is
relatively ineffective on its own. Some
respondents were very critical of the
industry’s role in education and argued that
it could do more to promote responsible
drinking.
• The industry has also supported alcohol
research. Critics are concerned about the
possible manipulation of research agendas
and project findings by the industry. They
pointed out that research, particularly when
funded by the industry, must be governed in
a way that explicitly protects the
independence of researchers. It would appear
that clearer criteria for research governance in
the alcohol field are needed.
• Further research should include studies of
the impact of alcohol education campaigns,
including those that are part of a broader
programme of action on alcohol problems.
This evidence must be used to inform future
campaigns. Also, an investigation of different
models of research governance in the alcohol
field is needed to provide a basis for clearer
criteria for future research, including that
funded by the industry, government and
non-governmental organisations.
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The Government and the drinks industry have
placed great emphasis on self-regulation as a
means of promoting social responsibility and
preventing alcohol-related harm. This chapter
explores the various codes of practice and self-
regulatory activities within the alcohol industry
and assesses their advantages and limitations.
What is self-regulation?
Self-regulation has been defined as:
… the means by which members of a profession,
trade, or commercial activity are bound by a
mutually agreed set of rules that govern their
relationship with the citizen, client or customer.
Such rules may be accepted voluntarily or may be
compulsory. They will normally include a
procedure for resolving complaints and for the
application of sanctions against those who
infringe the rules.
(Better Regulation Task Force, 1999)
Self-regulation is best seen as a family of
regulatory instruments (National Consumer
Council, 2000). It can take the form of
independent action by individual organisations
– such as companies – to set internal standards
of conduct. Alternatively, it may be driven by an
independent collective body, such as a trade
association. Self-regulation can also be
embodied in formal codes of practice negotiated
between Government and the representatives of
a particular sector.
The UK has a long tradition of self-
regulation associated with its informal ‘club’
style of governance (Baggott, 1989; Moran,
2003). However, many self-regulatory activities
are now quite formal and subject to greater state
involvement. Indeed, many contemporary self-
regulatory systems are best described as ‘co-
regulation’ (Grabosky and Braithwaite, 1986).
Government is closely involved in monitoring
self-regulation and may possess reserve
statutory powers, either to prevent certain
activities or compel action, including redress.
Moreover, according to Levi-Faur and Gilad
(2004, p. 19), self-regulation acts as a tool of
public control, by internalising social norms and
responding to public pressures and demands.
Efforts to improve responsiveness and
accountability include regular public reports on
the conduct of self-regulatory systems and the
involvement of independent experts or lay
people on self-regulatory bodies.
Given the variety of self-regulatory systems,
it is difficult to comment on their overall
effectiveness. Nonetheless, one can identify
‘theoretical’ advantages and drawbacks of self-
regulation compared with direct state
regulation. The main advantages are as follows.
1 Self-regulation harnesses the ‘inside’
knowledge and expertise of those who are
being regulated.
2 It is based on consensus and is likely to lead
to higher compliance.
3 The spirit as well as the letter of regulation is
more likely to be upheld.
4 It is less costly to Government and may be
less costly to those being regulated.
5 It is more flexible and therefore more able to
respond quickly to new and changing
circumstances.
4 Self-regulation
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These are balanced by disadvantages.
1 Self-regulation tends to be complacent and
rules may be unenforced or under-enforced.
2 It lacks legitimacy and attracts suspicion that
self-regulatory bodies are concerned
primarily with protecting their members’
interests.
3 Few real sanctions can be applied, as self-
regulatory bodies have limited powers to
ensure compliance.
4 Self-regulatory bodies cannot control the
activities of non-members (unless there is an
externally enforced system of compulsory
membership or licensing).
5 Self-regulatory bodies often have conflicts of
interest. For example, the exclusion of a
member may lead to loss of revenue. Self-
regulatory bodies that also have a
representative role (such as trade
associations, for example) experience internal
tensions that undermine their regulatory role.
6 Self-regulation is not as publicly accountable
as state regulation.
7 Self-regulation can be costly, placing a
considerable burden on the industry (or
profession) and also on Government,
particularly where there is a ‘co-regulation’
element.
In the past, debates about self-regulation
have been polarised, with critics seeing it as a
soft option. More recently, it has been
acknowledged that self-regulation can be
effective, providing that key principles are
upheld. According to the National Consumer
Council (2005), for example, self-regulatory
systems should have the following features:
1 clear objectives
2 ingredients of regulation (rules/
monitoring/enforcement/redress)
3 wide consultation about design and
operation
4 a dedicated structure (separate from the
industry) to engender public confidence
5 independent representation (majority of
members of regulatory body should be
independent including, ideally, the chair)
6 monitoring of compliance
7 public accountability (through an annual
report, for example)
8 good publicity about the scheme
9 adequate resources
10 a well-publicised complaints procedure
11 effective sanctions
12 performance indicators
13 regular reviews of the self-regulatory
system.
Turning specifically to the drinks industry,
self-regulation covers many areas of social
responsibility, such as the advertising,
marketing and promotion of alcohol products,
and standards of retailing in the licensed trade.
Some self-regulatory practices are formalised in
codes and are enforced by collective
organisations, while others remain informal.
Figure 1 shows the variety of self-regulatory
systems that operate in this field.
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Advertising standards
Alcohol advertising is covered by national codes
for broadcast and non-broadcast media,
respectively. For non-broadcast media (press,
magazines, direct mail, posters and cinema), the
code is drawn up by the Advertising Standards
Authority’s (ASA’s) Committee of Advertising
Practice (CAP), whose members are drawn from
the advertising industry. Following recent
changes to media regulation, ASA now also has
responsibility for the broadcast advertising
codes (drawn up by a Broadcast Committee of
Advertising Practice – BCAP) on behalf of the
government regulator, OFCOM, which
approves the codes for TV and radio, and has
powers to intervene if it believes the regulatory
system is not working effectively. ASA’s work is
funded by independent boards of finance,
which levy the advertising industry. The ASA
Council – which has a two-thirds majority of lay
members (including Jean Coussins, the former
chief executive of the Portman Group) –
adjudicates complaints about breaches of the
code through separate panels for broadcasting
and non-broadcast media. ASA also offers
advice and guidance on interpretation of the
codes and monitors the media for possible
breaches.
Those who breach the non-broadcast code
face several possible sanctions. ASA judgements
are made public and this may reflect badly on
the advertiser. In addition, ASA may advise that
advertising space or other services are withheld
Figure 1  Self-regulation in the alcoholic drinks industry
Advertising Standards Authority
• British Code of Advertising, Sales
Promotion and Direct Marketing
• Television Advertising Standards Code*
• Radio Advertising Standards Code*
National standards
Social responsibility standards for
the production and sale of
alcoholic drinks
Company codes and policies
For example: Diageo marketing
code, Mitchells & Butlers’ alcohol
and social responsibility policy
Portman Group
• Code of Practice on Naming, Packaging and
Promotion of Alcoholic Drinks
• Commitment to Action agreement
• Guidance on Unit Labelling
• Guidance on Retail Sales Promotions
Trade associations
• For example: British Beer and Pub Association
Code on Point of Sale Promotions
• Scotch Whisky Association Code of Practice
for Responsible Marketing of Scotch Whisky
• British Institute of Innkeeping Code of Practice
• Bar Entertainment and Dance Association
Dispersal Policy
• Responsible retailing of alcohol: guidance
for the off-trade
*Subject to OFCOM approval.
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from non-compliant advertisers. It is also
possible that non-compliant advertisers could
lose trade association privileges or be expelled
from membership. Advertisers that persistently
break the rules may have their marketing
communications vetted. Moreover, those that
have complaints upheld on their poster
advertisements may be required to submit
future copy for pre-clearance, a scheme
implemented with the co-operation of the
Outdoor Advertising Association. Point of sale
advertising is not covered by ASA’s rules unless
associated with a specific sales promotion.
Although internet advertising is within its
remit, website content is excluded. Cinema
advertising is covered by ASA’s non-broadcast
code and subject to pre-clearance by the Cinema
Advertising Association and the British Board of
Film Classification. For broadcasters,
compliance with ASA is a licence requirement
and failure to comply risks intervention from
OFCOM. All broadcast advertisements are
subject to pre-clearance (by radio and TV
clearing centres, separate from ASA).
The rules on alcohol advertising in broadcast
and non-broadcast media have been
strengthened over the years. The current rules
on television advertising require that
‘advertisements for alcoholic drinks must not be
likely to appeal strongly to people under 18, in
particular by reflecting or being associated with
youth culture’. In addition, new rules were
introduced on associations of alcoholic drinks
with sexual activity, daring, toughness,
aggression or anti-social behaviour, and with
handling and serving of drinks. The non-
broadcast rules were revised along similar lines,
though with different wording. For example,
ASA’s non-broadcast code rules now state that:
… marketing communications should not be
associated with people under 18 or reflect their
culture. They should not feature or portray real or
fictitious characters who are likely to appeal
particularly to people under 18 in a way that might
encourage them to drink.
And that:
… marketing communications should not be
directed at people under 18 through the selection
of media, style of presentation, content or
context in which they appear.
And specifies that:
… no medium should be used to advertise
alcoholic drinks if more than 25 per cent of its
audience is under 18 years of age.
Alcoholic drink is a heavily advertised
product. In 2004, over £180 million was spent on
main media advertising, excluding sponsorship
and internet marketing (Key Note, 2005). In the
same year, complaints about alcohol advertising
represented around 1 per cent of total complaints
resolved by ASA. It has upheld complaints
against several drinks companies in recent years,
including some members of the Portman Group.
Industry respondents were satisfied with the
new advertising rules and the expanded role of
ASA into broadcast advertising. For example,
one commented that the industry ‘was broadly
happy with the new codes’ (I8). Another stated
that ‘the new advertising rules are robust and
must be given time to work’ (I7). On the other
hand, non-industry respondents were more
critical of the self-regulatory approach to alcohol
promotion in general, rather than of ASA in
particular, and their concerns are discussed in
more detail later.
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The Portman Group code
The Portman Group (2003) has its own code of
practice on naming, packaging and promotion
of alcoholic drinks. This was initially introduced
in 1996 to stave off a ban on alcopops. The
current version of this code covers sponsorship,
sampling, websites, advertorials (an
advertisement designed to simulate editorial
content), branded merchandise and press
releases, and includes the naming and
packaging of products within its remit. It covers
point-of-sale activities and materials generated
by UK producers and distributors, but excludes
wholesaler- and retailer-led promotions (except
when these promote own-brand products).
Previous editions of the Portman code covered
merchandising of alcoholic drinks. Retailer
promotions are now covered by the BBPA code
(for pubs and bars) and a new code of practice
for off-licensed premises (both of which are
discussed below).
The Portman code covers similar
‘associations’ as the ASA codes. For example, it
states that naming, packaging and promotional
material should not be associated with bravado;
with violent, aggressive or anti-social
behaviour; with drugs; with social or sexual
success; or with illegal, immoderate or
irresponsible consumption. In addition, such
material must not ‘have a particular appeal to
under 18s’. In a similar way to ASA, the
Portman Group provides an advisory service to
companies developing new products and
campaigns before they reach the market, which
receives around 150–200 queries a year.
Enforcement of the Portman code relies on
complaints, which are investigated by an
independent panel. This comprises individuals
with no connection to the Portman Group or its
member companies and is chaired by a former
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.
Complaints to the Portman Group, which
peaked at 38 in 1997, have been in the range of
ten to 20 per annum in recent years. In 2004, the
panel upheld ten complaints (out of 11). Products
and promotions found in breach of the code are
followed up by the Portman Group, which may
request modification or withdrawal. It claims a
high level of compliance, with a third of products
being withdrawn and over 40 per cent modified
as a result of adverse judgements. However, in a
fifth of cases where complaints were upheld,
compliance was either not achieved or unknown.
The Portman Group can issue alerts requesting
retailers not to reorder stocks until a decision has
been complied with, though existing stock may
continue to be sold. One industry informant
commented that proposals to force retailers to
take stocks off the shelves and compensate them
accordingly had been rejected (I5).
The Portman Group stated that failure by
retailers to comply with such alerts could lead
to relevant licensing authorities and/or trading
standards bodies being informed. Although its
code has been recommended by the Secretary of
State for Culture, Media and Sport for inclusion
in local statements of licensing policy, it is
unclear how and to what extent breaches of the
code are actually followed up by these
authorities (to ensure compliance with the code
for example). At present, licensing authorities
have no powers to promote compliance with the
Portman code or its retail alerts. Indeed, the
extent of licensee compliance with alerts is
unknown. Similarly, nothing is known about the
extent to which non-compliant licensees are
referred to the authorities or the consequences
of such referrals.
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As noted earlier, previous versions of the
Portman code covered merchandising. The code
still covers producer-led retail promotions and
the promotion of own-label products by
retailers. The Portman Group has issued
additional guidance on avoiding immoderate
consumption in such promotions. Among other
things, this guidance suggests spreading
promotions over longer periods to avoid short-
term excessive consumption (for example, by
issuing proof of purchase coupons, which can
then be redeemed at the end of the period of the
offer).
Interviewees from the industry were highly
supportive of the Portman Group code and its
advisory service. They argued that the code
discouraged bad practice and was particularly
effective in dealing with promotional materials
that associated alcohol with sexual themes.
Organisations representing the retail sector said
they believed that the retail alerts were effective,
especially with larger businesses, but that
smaller operators were more difficult to reach.
While acknowledging the importance of alerts,
most retail associations did not see themselves
as having a role in enforcing them, though some
said that they notified breaches to the Portman
Group. Industry respondents firmly rebutted
the idea that the Portman Group was soft on the
industry and pointed out that complaints had
been upheld against companies that actually
funded it.
Non-industry respondents took a more
critical view. Although the Portman code
addressed important areas of alcohol marketing
and promotion not covered by ASA, the
respondents believed that the Portman Group
lacked the independence to undertake such an
important regulatory role. Others said the
regime lacked effective sanctions. Indeed, one
respondent from local government said that
councils could do little to prevent a retailer from
stocking a ‘banned’ product unless its
association with a particular problem could be
proved. Some non-industry respondents
acknowledged that producers seeking notoriety
as a means of gaining access to youth markets
could get considerable short-term publicity by
breaching the code. This was denied by industry
respondents, including the Portman Group
itself. Even so, the precise impact of adverse
judgements was not clear and merits further
investigation.
Trade association codes
Trade associations have their own codes. For
example, the Scotch Whisky Association has a
code on responsible marketing, which covers
internet promotions and sponsorship, as well as
advertising. Uniquely within the industry, it
provides for financial penalties for breaching
the code (‘up to £10,000’) and expulsion in the
case of a company failing to take remedial
action. Members are expected to appoint a
senior director in the company to regulate
compliance. Furthermore, although the SWA
code is complaints-led, with cases initially
considered by a complaints committee of the
Association, there is an independent panel, to
which member companies and the public can
appeal, which is chaired by the director of
Scotland’s national alcohol charity, Alcohol
Focus Scotland.
The BBPA, meanwhile, has a code on drinks
promotions at the point of sale. Initially, this
took the form of a Good Practice Guide for pub
owners and licensees, warning of adverse
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consequences associated with some sales
promotions (BBPA, 2001). This was later revised
as Point of Sale Promotions: Standards for the
Management of Responsible Drinks Promotions,
including Happy Hours (BBPA, 2005). The latter
was more explicit in setting out principles and
standards with regard to preventing alcohol
misuse and anti-social behaviour. It also
identified irresponsible promotions, including
drinking games, free drinks, entry fees with
unlimited amounts of drinks and rewards
schemes that are only redeemable over short
periods. The new scheme was publicised as a
ban on ‘happy hours’ and other socially
irresponsible promotions. Because the BBPA
represents the major brewers and over half the
pubs in the UK, it argued that compliance
would be high. In interview, industry
respondents endorsed the new code and stated
that it was the best that could be achieved in the
current circumstances.
Non-industry respondents broadly
welcomed the BBPA code, but several expressed
doubts about enforcement, particularly given
the substantial minority of pubs that were not
members of the BBPA. Others identified strong
commercial pressures and managerial
imperatives within the industry, which created
incentives for licensees to engage in
irresponsible promotions, notwithstanding the
code. Some argued that the code was not as
comprehensive as claimed and that it did not
actually ban happy hours, or indeed any other
practices, but attempted to improve the
management of point of sale promotions.
The BBPA has stated that it will act on any
complaint about breaches of its code and will
pursue matters with the company concerned,
which is then responsible for dealing with the
licensee. Ultimately, the latter could be in breach
of their contract as an employee or tenant.
However, this is uncertain legal territory – much
depends on the extent to which the licensee is
adjudged to be putting the premises’ licence in
jeopardy. Moreover, the licensee would have a
strong defence if they could prove that their
activities were in response to a competitive
commercial environment or a management
directive to increase sales.
As noted by some non-industry respondents,
many licensees are outside the jurisdiction of
the BBPA and its member companies. Industry
insiders acknowledged that this could make the
code difficult to enforce, though they, along
with some non-industry respondents, believed
that, if licensing authorities used the code as a
benchmark for good practice when approving
or revoking licences, its impact could be
strengthened. They pointed out that the code
was mentioned as ‘good practice’ in guidance to
the Licensing Act (DCMS, 2004), though this is
regarded as a fairly weak legal foundation.
Industry respondents were reluctant to play
an enforcement role in this area. Even those that
supported minimum pricing rules as a means of
preventing irresponsible promotions noted that
competition law could restrict the ability of
regulators and the industry to take action. For
example, a voluntary collective ban on happy
hours or an agreement on minimum prices is
open to challenge as an anti-competitive
practice. However individual companies can set
minimum prices, providing that they do not
collude with others in so doing.
The legal position on discounted prices is
more complex where local licensing bodies are
involved. In England, these authorities may
encourage voluntary codes, such as the BBPA
25
Self-regulation
code. They may also attach conditions regarding
irresponsible promotions to a premises licence,
where there is clear evidence that this will
promote consistency with the licensing
objectives. The imposition of such conditions
could, however, be challenged in the courts (see
Kolvin, 2005, p. 509). Licensing authorities have
also been warned against adopting policies on
minimum prices and drinks promotions because
of fears of legal challenge (DCMS, 2004). Even
so, pricing conditions are permitted within both
European and domestic law, providing that they
are unilaterally imposed by public authorities
and compulsory (Kolvin, 2005, p. 511).
Nonetheless, they may provoke legal challenges
under competition law, deterring licensing
authorities from pursuing such a policy. It is in
this rather confusing context that the Home
Affairs Committee (2005, p. 108) called for
stronger guidance from Government on
irresponsible promotions and clarification by
the Office of Fair Trading on the legality of local
minimum pricing policies. This is an important
issue in other jurisdictions. Recently, in Victoria,
Australia, an inquiry into alcohol policy
recommended that national competition laws be
reviewed to ensure that they did not impede
alcohol strategies (Victoria Parliament Drugs
and Crime Prevention Committee, 2006).
In Scotland, short-term discounted price
promotions and other irresponsible promotions
will be prohibited by statute when schedule 4 of
the Licensing Scotland Act 2005 comes into
force, while the Irish Republic already has legal
provisions preventing licensees from reducing
prices for any limited period during the day. As
a footnote to this, one should be aware that
previous efforts to set minimum prices have
been challenged, not by consumers or ‘rogue
landlords’, but by some of the leading pubcos.
Although the industry is genuinely concerned
about adverse publicity associated with happy
hours and other discounted drinks promotions,
it nonetheless wishes to retain the commercial
freedom to set prices and promote its products.
The off-licence retailers also have codes of
practice that mention alcohol promotions. These
form part of wider policies on social
responsibility, and include issues such as under-
age sales and staff training, which are discussed
further below (see Association of Convenience
Stores et al., 2004).
Corporate codes
Most of the larger producer companies have
internal codes of practice on the promotion and
marketing of alcohol. For example, Diageo’s
marketing code sets out key principles
including ‘compliance with laws and
regulations’, ‘not targeting under-age drinkers’
and the ‘depiction of responsible drinking’, as
well as provisions on abstinence, offensive
advertising, alcohol content, medicinal or
therapeutic value, drinking and driving, social
and sexual success, anti-social activities and
promotional activities in the retail sector. Staff
are also issued with guidelines to accompany
the code. The code and the guidelines apply to
all stages of the marketing process, including
product innovation. At various stages in the
product development and marketing process
there is an opportunity to identify concerns
through a traffic-light system. Hence a red light
will halt the project until the issue is resolved
and may result in it being referred back to the
previous stage in the process. An orange rating
will lead to a review of the particular aspect
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causing concern, which must be addressed by
the next stage. Ultimately, at least two people
including the project leader will sign off the
project, stating that it is code-compliant. The
code also applies to agencies undertaking work
on behalf of the company and covers internet
promotions as well. In addition, staff in relevant
areas including marketing, innovation, market
research and promotion receive induction
training and are offered refresher courses at
least every 18 months.
Other major producer companies have
reviewed their codes in recent years and have
moved in the same direction. Industry
respondents spoke of considerable peer
pressure to improve codes in line with industry
best practice. The Portman Group has advised
companies on how to improve their marketing
codes. Retail companies also have their own
codes, which extend beyond marketing and
promotions to the drinking environment. For
example, Mitchells & Butlers, a pubco, has an
alcohol and social responsibility policy that
covers the sale of alcohol, the operation of
licensed premises, pricing and responsible
promotions. These retail sector codes are
discussed further in the context of efforts to
promote responsible retailing.
It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of
company codes. Industry critics state that they
are ‘mainly window dressing’ (N9) and allege
that companies regularly flout their own codes.
They note that even the larger companies with a
reputation for social responsibility have been
found in breach of the ASA and Portman Group
codes. Nonetheless, interviewees from the large
producer companies claim that their internal
codes do work and that, in the words of one,
‘the plug has been pulled’ (I11) on products and
marketing campaigns that are likely to breach
these codes. Some companies have
commissioned external audits of their codes
and/or their marketing activities. But, from an
outsider’s point of view, there is really no way
of evaluating the impact of these codes without
unprecedented access to internal product
development processes and marketing
activities.
Evaluating the codes on advertising,
marketing and promotion
Although the industry has made efforts to
strengthen its codes and to bring them together
(most recently in the national standards
document – see Chapter 2), obvious
shortcomings remain. The national standards do
not supersede other codes. There are
inconsistencies between codes (for example, the
different wording used to describe product
appeal to under 18s, noted earlier). The
jurisdiction of different codes is confusing – for
example, point of sale advertising and
promotions could be covered by any one of
three different codes (Portman, ASA non-
broadcast and BBPA). The independence of self-
regulatory systems is limited, though there is
lay involvement in the complaints procedures of
ASA, the Scotch Whisky Association and the
Portman Group. Mechanisms of enforcement
rely heavily on complaints, rather than on
proactive monitoring or policing (though some
have an element of self-policing, notably the
ASA codes). Few codes are independently
monitored, audited or evaluated. Most lack
visibly effective sanctions against transgressors.
There is also an uncertain relationship between
self-regulation and statutory regulation, which
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means that the scope for subjecting persistent
offenders to even tougher penalties is not fully
exploited. An attempt has been made to ‘co-
regulate’, as in broadcast advertising where the
state regulator OFCOM and the self-regulatory
body ASA share responsibilities, but this fairly
new arrangement awaits proper evaluation.
Although most non-industry respondents
believed that there was a place for self-
regulation, they argued that reform was needed
to promote consistency between codes and to
introduce stronger sanctions. More extensive
involvement by lay people and non-industry
experts in the processes of self-regulation was
also suggested. A minority wanted a partial or
outright statutory ban on alcohol advertising
and promotion, which would reduce or remove
the scope for self-regulation.
A full and systematic evaluation of the actual
effectiveness of the self-regulatory system across
the whole range of alcohol marketing and
promotion would be timely. It should be noted
that there is considerable scepticism about
current systems of self-regulation in this field.
Evidence from other countries – including New
Zealand, Australia, the Netherlands, and the
USA – suggests that self-regulatory systems
have fallen short of expectations (Federal Trade
Commission, 1999; Jones, 2000; STAP, 2003; Hill,
2004). Jackson et al. (2000) argue that the
industry has been unable to resist commercial
imperatives – such as the need to appeal to the
youth market – and has espoused marketing
practices (such as designer drinks) that have
serious adverse implications for public health.
To expect the industry to self-regulate in such
circumstances is, these authors argue,
hopelessly unrealistic. They conclude that the
regulatory process is reactive, ad hoc and weak
and can be more effective only by controlling
the whole marketing mix. This would involve
comprehensive powers to regulate promotion
(including point of sale promotions) vested in
statutory, independent bodies, which would
replace current systems of self-regulation.
Further recommendations are that international-
level regulation is needed to reflect the
industry’s global operations; that regulation
must be informed by reliable market
intelligence; and that the public health
community needs to achieve a better
understanding of young people’s lifestyles with
regard to alcohol. Similar arguments are made
by Caswell and Maxwell (2005), who call for a
new statutory framework to monitor and
control the full marketing mix.
Recent research has provided a basis for
stricter regulation. For example, an Australian
study identified the role of the internet in
marketing products to under-age drinkers and
that this required more policing (Carroll and
Donovan, 2002). A host of studies from several
countries have identified the appeal of alcohol
advertisements to adolescents, even when they
are not deliberately targeted at them (Dring and
Hope, 2001; Cragg Ross Dawson, 2004; Hastings
et al., 2005; Jernigan et al., 2005; Mosher and
Johnson, 2005), while others suggest that alcohol
marketing has actually impacted on young
people’s drinking habits (Ellickson et al., 2005;
Hastings et al., 2005; Snyder et al., 2006).
Responsible retailing
A further set of important self-regulatory
activities come under the rubric of responsible
retailing. This includes the activities of trade
bodies as well as company initiatives. It is not
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possible to explore all of these in depth, but
some key areas are discussed below.
Under-age drinking
The drinks industry has pursued various
initiatives to discourage under-age drinking,
including efforts to remind licensees of their
legal responsibilities. Trade associations, such as
the BBPA, the WSA, the ACS, the BRC, and the
Portman Group, have been active in this area for
many years. In addition, pubco, off-licence
chain and supermarket company policies
emphasise the importance of adhering to this
and other aspects of the law. These policies are
supported by staff training – to promote
understanding, awareness and key skills (see
below) – and by disciplinary procedures.
The industry has backed ‘proof of age
schemes’ to assist with enforcement of the law.
In the past, proof of age has been relatively easy
to fake. However, there is now an accredited
scheme (the proof of age standards scheme –
PASS), which the retail trade believes to be more
secure. The Portman Group Proof of Age Card,
an initiative begun in the early 1990s, has
received accreditation under this scheme (along
with several others). Other initiatives in this
field include ‘Challenge 21’, backed by the
major retailers and retail trade associations. This
requires staff to ask people seeking to purchase
or consume alcohol from licensed premises,
who appear to be under 21, for proof of their
age (such as the Portman Proof of Age Card,
Citizen Card or passport/driving licence).
Critics argue that the industry is still not
doing enough to combat under-age purchase
and consumption of alcohol. Test purchasing,
which focuses on premises most likely to offend,
continues to find high levels of serving to
under-age customers. In the summer 2004
alcohol misuse enforcement campaign in
England and Wales, 45 per cent of on-licensed
premises and 31 per cent of off-licensed
premises targeted by the authorities were found
to have sold alcohol unlawfully to people under
18. In the subsequent winter 2004/05 campaign,
32 per cent of both on and off licences subjected
to test purchasing were caught selling to under-
age drinkers. A further enforcement campaign
in 2005 found that 29 per cent of on-licences and
19 per cent of off-licensed premises broke the
law on under-age sales (Home Office, 2006).
Industry sources argued that improved
systems of identity (which may follow from the
introduction of national identity cards) and
better staff training were needed. The industry
remains to be persuaded that stronger laws and
penalties for serving under-age drinkers are
required, but agrees that the law should be
properly enforced and that persistent offenders
be punished accordingly. Recent changes in
licensing legislation have emphasised the
importance of requesting evidence of a
customer’s age as a defence against serving
under 18s. In England, the DCMS (2004)
emphasised the role of ‘PASS-accredited’
schemes in its guidance on the 2003 Licensing
Act. In Scotland, the required ‘evidence’ is
actually specified in the Act as a passport, a
European Union photocard driving licence or
such other documents as may be prescribed by
the Government. Meanwhile, in the Republic of
Ireland, it is a requirement that people aged
between 18 and 21 carry a valid proof of age
document when in a bar. The Irish Government
has proposed that this requirement be extended
to people under 25.
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The drinking environment
Although focusing primarily on the individual
aspects of alcohol misuse, the drinks industry
acknowledges that the drinking environment is
an important factor in alcohol misuse. The
industry can contribute to the quality and safety
of the drinking environment, and thereby
reduce the chances of excessive drinking and
disorder. Voluntary efforts are encouraged by
trade bodies but depend largely on
implementation by individual companies and
licensees. Increasingly company-wide policies
have been adopted. Pubcos have policies or
codes that cover aspects of the drinking
environment. Mitchells & Butlers’ ‘alcohol and
social responsibility policy’, referred to earlier,
mentions ‘common-sense’ factors such as good
management and design of premises, and lists
unacceptable promotions (for example, drinking
games, initial payments to obtain cheap alcohol,
time-limited promotions lasting less than three
hours, ‘two for one’ type deals). Another pubco,
Wetherspoon, previously noted by some
commentators for its ‘low cost approach to
selling booze’ (see Warner, 2006), introduced a
new policy aimed at preventing binge drinking
and alcohol-related disorder. This included: an
end to ‘two for one’ offers and spirit offers
(where doubles were sold for less than the price
of two singles); ceasing ‘all you can drink for £x’
offers; availability of fair-priced soft and non-
alcoholic drinks; the serving of reasonably
priced food later in the evening; installation of
CCTV; improved toilet facilities; a 48-hour week
for managers and staff with two days off per
week; a high level of managers per pub; and
staff training (evidence submitted to Home
Affairs Committee, 2005).
Another relevant issue concerns the
prevention of glass injuries in licensed premises.
Following publicity about the severity of glass
injuries associated with alcohol-related violence,
the industry has moved towards the use of
toughened glass. However, this has been offset to
an extent by the increased popularity of drinking
from glass bottles. Moreover, it should be noted
that the evidence on the protective effect of
toughened glass is equivocal. One study found
that injuries to staff actually increased following
the introduction of toughened glass (Warburton
and Shepherd, 2000).
Training and professional standards
Industry and non-industry respondents agreed
that better standards of training could improve
social responsibility and help to prevent
alcohol-related problems. Training can enhance
implementation of both voluntary codes of
practice and statutory provisions. There is also a
significant evidence base to support
interventions to extend and improve staff
training. According to one review:
… intensive, high quality face to face server
training, when accompanied by strong and active
management support, is effective in reducing
intoxication rates in customers.
(Mulvihill et al., 2005, p. 3; see also Stockwell et
al., 1993; Shults et al., 2001; Toomey et al., 2001)
Training schemes are even more effective
when supported by enforcement from
regulatory authorities. Training on social
responsibility issues occurs at all levels and
sectors of the industry. The training of staff
involved in product development, marketing
and promotion by drinks producers has already
been mentioned. The remainder of this section
focuses on retail standards.
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As one industry respondent observed, ‘most
responsible operators have their own staff
training programmes’ (I6). Both induction and
refresher courses cover aspects of social
responsibility. For example, a spokesperson
from one pubco explained how potential
licensees are screened for suitability and are
subject to a key skills audit. An induction
course, based on a plausible scenario, uses an
interactive case study approach. Further
training, in the form of workshops, is available
for existing licensees. Pubcos also offer training
opportunities for supervisors and staff.
Trade associations (in both on- and off-
licence sectors) and the Portman Group support
training with materials such as videos and
leaflets setting out legal responsibilities and
how to deal with difficult situations. Trade
bodies also provide further advice and support.
For example, the Association of Convenience
Stores offers practical advice to small
shopkeepers to help them develop strategies for
resisting under-age sales and skills in dealing
with intimidation from gangs of youths.
A key body in this field is the British
Institute of Innkeeping (BII), founded in 1981 to
improve professional standards in the licensed
trade. It currently has over 17,000 members.
Those found to be in breach of its code of
practice face exclusion from membership.
Meanwhile, the BII Awards Board (BIIAB) is an
accredited vocational qualifications body for the
licensed retail sector. BIIAB qualifications cater
for the training needs of licensees, supervisors,
bar staff and others in the licensed trade, as well
as licensing regulators. Courses are delivered at
local centres across the country. Other providers
are also engaged in training and qualifications
for the licensed trade. North of the border,
training is also provided by the alcohol agency
Alcohol Focus Scotland (AFS) through its
‘Servewise’ programme. This has three main
components: law, alcohol and people skills.
Separate courses are provided for licensees,
managers and staff, and for on- and off-licensed
premises. AFS trains the trainers who then
deliver the course across 60 centres. It sets the
curriculum, standards and examinations. The
curriculum has been developed and reviewed
with input from the drinks industry.
Training is an emerging area of co-regulation.
Under the 2003 licensing legislation, new
applicants for personal licences in England and
Wales must have a mandatory qualification.
These are accredited by DCMS and the
qualification and curriculum authorities and
include the BII’s National Certificate for
Personal Licence Holders. However, there is
exemption for existing licensees with
experiential knowledge who have been granted
so-called ‘grandfather rights’ under the new
law. In Scotland there are no such rights. The
Scottish licensing legislation of 2005 requires all
licensees to hold a qualification from an
accredited body. It also specifically requires
supervisors and bar staff, as well as licensing
authority members and officers, to undertake
approved training programmes. More detailed
prescriptions on training (including ‘refresher’
training) are currently being formulated and
will be subject to secondary legislation.
Most observers (from both the industry and
outside) agree that improvements are taking
place in training. Even so, there is a view, not
confined to non-industry respondents, that
further improvements could be made, for
example to strengthen the social responsibility
elements of training, ensure all licensees and
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their staff are properly trained, and require that
‘refresher’ training is undertaken.
Other self-regulatory initiatives
In July 2003, the Portman Group established a
social responsibility scheme for producers
known as ‘Commitment to Action’. This
agreement, which has since been updated
(Portman Group, 2005a), sets out the actions
that member companies are prepared to
undertake beyond their existing legal and self-
regulatory obligations. It covers several
domains of activity including promotion, unit
labelling and social responsibility messages. The
Portman Group regularly monitors the
compliance of each company in each domain.
The October 2005 audit showed that, where
relevant, all companies complied with
commitments on unit labelling (with minor
exceptions on non-UK brands), responsibility
messages at sponsored events, straplines on
brand advertising referring to the Portman
Group, annual code awareness training for
product development and marketing staff and
external agencies, and use of the Portman
Group’s pre-clearance advice service before
launching a new product or promotion. All but
one member complied with a commitment to
review social responsibility clauses in supply
contracts. Compliance with other commitments
was mixed (with regard to social responsibility
messages on consumer advertising and
packaging, and website links to
Drinkaware.co.uk). Compliance in another
domain – distribution of Portman Group
campaign materials – did not apply, as no such
requests had been made during this period
(Portman Group, 2005b).
Self-regulation: an overview
The industry clearly favours self-regulation.
Industry respondents believe that it imposes
less of a burden than direct regulation. They
also claim that self-regulation is more effective
than direct regulation in responding flexibly
and quickly to problems. Non-industry
respondents were more sceptical. Some blamed
the Government for seeking to evade its
responsibilities and place them on the shoulders
of industry. However, most of them agreed that
a degree of self-regulation was needed.
Although, as this chapter has shown, there is
plenty of self-regulatory activity, there are
weaknesses in the current system, which can be
summarised as follows.
The codes lack consistency and overall
coherence. As one non-industry respondent
noted ‘a whole-industry approach is needed’
(N11). The formulation of a new industry-wide
code on social responsibility (see Chapter 2) is
viewed as a step in the right direction but, as
noted, does not replace existing codes, nor does
it address the variations between codes in terms
of their language and scope. Previous moves to
rationalise the codes did not succeed. The
inclusion of all point of sale promotions within
the Portman code (a scheme known as ‘Portman
plus’) was considered, but never commanded
sufficient support from within the industry.
More could be done to establish effective co-
regulation, with tougher statutory backing.
According to one non-industry respondent
‘there has to be a closer relationship between
systems of state regulation and self-regulation’
(N8). Another stated that ‘self-regulation should
not be seen in isolation, but in the context of the
State’s regulatory powers ... it is a question of
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balance between state and self-regulation’ (N7).
Some within the industry shared these concerns
and urged a clearer framework of statutory
regulation. One stated that ‘co-regulation
requires a clear and effective relationship
between statutory and self-regulation’ (I12)
while another acknowledged that:
… self-regulation does need a broader
framework. It needs official approval and must be
consistent with statutory and self-regulation.
Indeed co-regulation is the best way forward,
where statutory and self-regulation work in
partnership.
(I11)
Co-regulation is already undertaken in the
field of broadcast advertising. There are
elements of co-regulation in other areas
(including the legal requirements regarding
training for licensees and the appearance of
industry codes in licensing guidance). But
statutory provisions could be strengthened in
order to give these self-regulatory systems more
teeth. As one non-industry respondent argued
‘codes need to be tied into existing licensing
legislation’ (N5). The Scottish approach, where
issues such as training and drinks promotions
are covered by stronger statutory provisions,
could be a way forward.
Which leads on to a further point about
enforcement. As one non-industry respondent
noted ‘there is no real punishment for
contravening codes’ (N4). Another observed
that the absence of sanctions meant that the
codes lacked weight especially in a competitive
business environment. ‘Codes lack impact when
people are struggling for business. They fall by
the wayside’ (N5). The non-industry
respondents believed that current codes
provided little incentive to comply and that
stronger sanctions should be implemented.
Indeed, critics remained convinced that self-
regulation as currently practised represented a
soft option. One observed that ‘pure self-
regulation is a fool’s game and a smokescreen’
(N11) while another stated that ‘voluntary
regulation should be a step on the road to
proper regulation’ (N3).
The industry denied that self-regulation was
weak. According to one respondent:
… people see self-regulation as industry
regulating themselves in a what hurts least way,
which enables them to get away with a lot … in
reality compliance is very high in the field of self-
regulation.
(I8)
Another claimed that:
… drinks companies can be and are critical of
rogue elements. They censure behaviour of
companies that don’t uphold the spirit of
regulation. Peer pressure is strong and even
larger companies have been internally criticised.
(I10)
Most industry sources argued that the best
weapon is ‘name and shame’, and that financial
sanctions (as in the Scotch Whisky code, for
example) were unnecessary.
However, ‘name and shame’ is a relatively
weak weapon, particularly in the absence of
further sanctions. Expulsion or suspension from
membership might carry weight. But trade
associations and membership organisations
found this problematic. Expelling or suspending
members could reduce membership and
income, and their ability to speak for the
industry or sector. Indeed, a non-industry
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respondent observed that ‘trade associations
find it very difficult to kick out members who
don’t meet standards’ (N6). While a trade
association spokesperson agreed that ‘we can’t
be in the business of throwing out our members;
that will make us weaker’ (I2).
A related issue was the regulation of non-
members who lay outside the remit of trade
bodies. Several industry respondents observed
that organisations that are not members are the
most problematic. Sanctions against non-
members (by trade association and by
producers) raised matters of competition law.
For example, attempts to refuse to supply a
‘rogue trader’ (for promoting drinks in a
socially irresponsible way, for example) might
lead to legal challenges. As one industry
informant admitted, even where supply
contracts specified that supplies could be
withdrawn in certain circumstances, this tended
to form a basis for negotiation rather than the
actual cessation of supplies (I12).
Although some codes do have proactive
monitoring, most self-regulatory activities are
‘complaints-led’. Complaints rely on vigilance
by the public, non-governmental organisations
and the industry itself. The problem is that,
even when a breach is identified, it takes time to
stop it, by which time considerable damage may
have been done. As one non-industry
respondent commented:
… a problem with relying on complaints is that
most of these people who are likely to complain
are unaware of the very forms of advertising and
promotion that are least socially responsible.
(N4)
However, in broadcast and some non-
broadcast advertising, there is pre-clearance,
which should minimise the possibility of future
breaches. Some regulators also offer advice
(such as the Portman Group and ASA) to help
advertisers and marketers avoid breaching the
codes. This is good practice, but does not
prevent all socially irresponsible promotional
activities. Most codes have an element of self-
policing. In the main this depends on other
companies informing the self-regulatory
authorities (which does happen). Other means
of promoting compliance (through the
appointment of dedicated compliance officers
by self-regulatory bodies and the publication of
statistics on compliance, for example) are less
common.
Some codes do have an independent
element. Notably, the ASA bodies do have a
significant lay input, both on their governing
bodies and on complaints panels. The Portman
Group has an independent complaints panel,
while the Scotch Whisky Association has an
independent complaint appeals panel. But there
is no apparent lay involvement in other codes,
such as the BBPA promotions code. The
involvement of lay people does not guarantee
independence. But it does create a sense of
openness and accountability, and helps to instil
public confidence in self-regulatory systems,
especially where matters of public health and
welfare are concerned. Another issue is the
funding of self-regulatory systems. ASA bodies
are funded by a levy via an independent
funding mechanism. Others are financed
directly by the industry, which leaves them
open to accusations of bias.
Finally, public reporting is regarded as a
positive attribute of any self-regulatory system.
In the alcohol field, public reports are available
on the Portman code and the advertising codes.
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Complaints judgements are published (and
available on the web). Some individual
companies also produce reports on their
corporate social responsibility policies or codes
of practice. However, across the industry as a
whole, there is no systematic approach to
reporting on self-regulatory processes and the
reports that are available vary considerably in
their public profile and accessibility. Very few
self-regulatory systems are independently
audited.
Non-industry commentators are sceptical
about self-regulation (see also Babor et al., 2003).
They advocate stronger sanctions and more co-
regulation. They want self-regulatory systems to
cover all parts of the industry and to have a
stronger independent input. Some within the
industry also realise that self-regulation must be
strengthened. More specifically, they
acknowledge that self-regulatory systems must
be more inclusive, more comprehensive and
supported by appropriate training. However,
there is more disagreement between the
industry and others on other key issues, such as
independent input into self-regulatory systems,
external evaluation and stronger enforcement
and sanctions (see also ICAP, 2004; EPC, 2006).
Conclusions
• A bewildering array of self-regulatory
systems govern the drinks industry. These
systems vary considerably in their scope,
inclusiveness, independence, degree of lay
involvement, extent of proactive monitoring,
sanctions and public accountability.
However, most systems are seen as weak by
critics, particularly in terms of enforcement.
There is also confusion about how these
codes relate to each other, notwithstanding
recent efforts to produce a single set of
national standards for the industry.
• Both industry and non-industry respondents
stated that more could be done to provide an
appropriate balance and greater consistency
between statutory and voluntary self-
regulation systems. There was support for
strengthening self-regulation by clarifying
the legal requirements for good practice (in
standards of training, for example). Self-
regulation could also be bolstered by
clarifying the legality of socially responsible
practices (particularly with regard to
discounted price promotions and competition
law).
• An assessment of the overall impact of self-
regulatory systems is needed, particularly
with regard to advertising, marketing and
promotion of alcoholic drinks, but also in
other areas such as under-age drinking,
training and the drinking environment. The
impact of the different approaches to
regulating point of sale promotions in
England and Wales compared with Scotland
(and the Irish Republic) is worthy of analysis.
It would also be interesting to compare the
outcomes of different regulatory systems for
marketing and promotion that have an
element of self-regulation, such as those
operating in the UK, Australia, the USA and
New Zealand.
• Both industry and non-industry respondents
saw training as having a crucial role, both in
relation to statutory and voluntary
regulation. Given the potential for
improvements in this area, more research is
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needed into the impact of training
programmes within the industry and how
they support socially responsible practice,
self-regulation and law enforcement. It is
important that future training programmes
are informed by this research.
• As one of the potential barriers to effective
self-regulation is the competitive nature of
the drinks business environment, there must
be further analysis of the relationship
between market conditions and competition,
management strategies and processes, and
regulatory compliance with both self-
regulation and statutory regimes.
Furthermore, the impact of contractual
arrangements to promote social responsibility
within the industry requires evaluation.
There should also be a closer examination of
the practices of the so-called ‘rogues and
cowboys’ in the industry, how they operate
and how they can be more effectively
regulated.
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This chapter examines the advantages and
disadvantages of partnership with the drinks
industry. It also examines the participation of
the drinks industry as a partner in local and
national initiatives to prevent alcohol problems.
The importance of partnership … and its
perils
Partnership has been recognised as an
important component of corporate social
responsibility (Grant and O’Connor, 2005).
Potential partners include Government, other
private sector organisations, professional
groups, non-government organisations and the
research community. Partnership has the
potential to avoid duplication, harness resources
and expertise, build trust and promote
consensus. Orley and Logan (2005) argue that
the alternative to partnership is an exclusionary
model that creates an adversarial relationship
between the industry and others. Although
partnership working can lead to greater co-
operation, there are disadvantages, particularly
where partners have unequal status, resources
and power. In such circumstances, partnerships
may be dominated by corporate interests, which
can use their position to block policies and
interventions that threaten their commercial
interests (Babor, 2000; McCreanor et al., 2000).
There are several principles that should
govern any partnership. It is important that the
aims of partnerships are clearly specified. They
must be as inclusive as possible and operate
with clear rules of engagement that protect the
interests of the weaker and poorly resourced
participants. The dilemmas raised by
partnership must be explicitly acknowledged: in
particular, participants may have to sacrifice
self-interest for the collective aims of the
partnership. Partnerships should not be viewed
as a magic solution to entrenched problems of
public policy. They are particularly difficult to
establish in areas that have a long history of
entrenched adversarial politics, such as alcohol
(Berridge, 2005). When partnerships are
established in such circumstances they often
fail, leaving an aftertaste of bitterness that
impedes future efforts to promote dialogue and
collaboration. This happened during the 1980s,
when the UK Government established an
alcohol forum involving three industry
associations, the Health Education Council and
Alcohol Concern. The forum collapsed when the
independent chair of the group insisted on a
large increase in industry funding for research
into alcohol problems (see Baggott, 1990, p. 47).
Twenty years on, partnership is once again
being encouraged by Government. Are the
prospects any rosier? Industry respondents
were positive about working with non-industry
organisations including government and public
sector bodies, the police and health professions,
and the voluntary sector. Most interviewees
from industry said they welcomed
opportunities to openly debate and discuss
issues with these other stakeholders, calling for
a ‘round table’ (I6, I8) or ‘big tent’ (I5) approach.
Some mentioned that this represented a change
in attitudes within the industry, where there had
previously been fear and reluctance to engage,
particularly with alcohol agencies.
Although industry personnel emphasised
the importance of inclusiveness, they remained
critical of organisations and individuals who
they believed were intransigently opposed to
the industry, though, as one respondent from a
large drinks producer conceded, ‘there are
5 Partnerships
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zealots on both sides’ (I11). Some industry
respondents were also cautious about working
in partnership with Government. One
commented that, though his trade association
was keen to work with Government, ‘it must be
a partnership of equals’ (I10). Finally, some
industry respondents noted that some aspects of
partnership could be construed as collusion and
might be considered anti-competitive. This was
raised particularly in the context of minimum
price agreements between the trade and public
authorities (see Chapter 4).
There was a mixed response from non-
industry respondents. Some saw clear
advantages in working with the industry. As one
respondent observed: ‘it would be boneheaded
not to work with the industry’ (N7). But there
was anxiety about the scope of such partnerships
and the rules of engagement. Underlying this
was a fear that the industry would dominate
partnership arrangements and manipulate them
to its advantage. One respondent was worried
about the undue influence of the industry on
voluntary organisations in particular: ‘they can
get drawn in and get out of their depth’ (N2).
Another observed that ‘views change when
people get close to the industry’ (N9). In the
words of another, ‘there was inevitable caution’
when dealing with the industry and ‘always the
potential for being manipulated’. This was
endorsed by others, including one respondent
who commented that ‘by working with NGOs,
industry gets credibility; the problem is they use
it’ (N10).
Non-industry respondents saw their
independence as crucial. One way to safeguard
this would be to have no dealings whatsoever
with industry, an approach backed by a
minority. But the majority were pragmatic. It
was suggested that the scope of partnerships
should be restricted. One interviewee accepted
that partnership could be useful with regard to
staff training and marketing issues, but that its
involvement was inappropriate in areas such as
research and school-based education (N10).
Another suggestion was to create a strong
framework to protect the independence of non-
industry participants. This could take the form
of comprehensive formal partnership
arrangements in which Government would
‘hold the ring’ and protect ‘weaker’
organisations (notably charities and voluntary
bodies). This was contrasted with current
informal, ad hoc and less inclusive ‘bilateral’
arrangements, where it was believed the
industry’s interests predominated. A non-
industry interviewee put this very clearly:
It would be far easier to work with the industry if
there was a clearer strategic framework and the
industry’s position within this was more
appropriate and more clearly defined. This would
enable discussions to take place in a clearer, more
transparent and open atmosphere than at
present. In other words there is a need for clearer
rules of engagement with the industry. This
would produce a win-win situation in that all
parties would know what is expected of them.
(N3)
National partnerships
Many interviewees endorsed the idea of a
national forum to bring together stakeholders in
this field, as illustrated by the following
comments from, respectively, an industry
respondent, a non-industry stakeholder and a
civil servant:
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… perhaps a national-level body is needed to
bring all views together, identify good practice
and reach greater consensus on alcohol issues.
(I6)
A national forum on alcohol, including all
stakeholders in the field including the industry,
would be really useful in taking the alcohol
strategy forward.
(N6)
There is a need for a national stakeholders’ forum
at a strategic, national level to advise Government
in this field. This would be a large body – it should
include all stakeholders such as the police,
medical and NGOs – in addition to the industry.
(N1)
These ideas are consistent with proposals to
create a national alcohol advisory forum to lead
on or oversee campaigns aimed at reducing
alcohol misuse (see Alcohol Concern, 2005). This
might include representatives of alcohol
agencies, the royal medical colleges, researchers,
law and order professions, local government
and the drinks industry. A similar body already
exists in Scotland – the Scottish Ministerial
Advisory Committee on Alcohol Policy
(SMACAP). Its membership is drawn from
Government, police, prison service, health
professions and the NHS, licensing authorities,
alcohol agencies, the industry and other
stakeholders.
England also has previous experience of
advisory forums in this field. An official
advisory committee on alcohol – the Kessel
committee – existed in the 1970s, though it did
not contain any industry representatives (see
Baggott, 1990). More recently, advisory groups
were established on the national alcohol
strategy and on licensing reform. Several
interviewees suggested that these advisory
mechanisms be revived, while others alluded to
recent moves to create a new inclusive forum for
the discussion of alcohol policy.
Others were more cautious about
establishing a new alcohol policy forum. There
were fears among the non-industry respondents
that such a body would be captured by industry.
Several urged that its structure and governance
must be carefully thought out. Others warned
that the body should not be a talking shop but
must be empowered to do things. It was also
pointed out that, given the large number of
potential stakeholders, the forum would find it
difficult to be both inclusive and manageable.
Local partnerships
Interviewees identified local partnerships as
making an important contribution to reducing
alcohol problems. Pubwatch schemes were
mentioned favourably by industry and non-
industry respondents, particularly by the police
and local authorities. These are local schemes
run by licensees, which aim to reduce crime and
disorder through communication and mutual
support. Each local Pubwatch is autonomous
and depends largely on the voluntary efforts of
local licensees, though they do receive financial
support from pubcos, some of which strongly
encourage their licensees to join.
A national voluntary organisation, National
Pubwatch, promotes the take-up of local
schemes and provides support and advice.
Police and local authorities also offer advice on
how licensees can prevent alcohol-related crime
and disorder. Close liaison between local
licensees and the authorities is increasingly the
norm, with the latter becoming much more
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proactive in recent years. Notably, the DCMS
(2004) guidance on the implementation of the
2003 Licensing Act states that licensing
authorities should familiarise themselves with
Pubwatch schemes in their area. In its report on
anti-social behaviour, the Home Affairs
Committee (2005) also identified Pubwatch
schemes as a means of promoting co-operative
working arrangements between the trade and
the police.
The strength of Pubwatch schemes is their
voluntary nature and their focus on local
problems and issues. But there are concerns
about their lack of sustainability in the longer
term (often because of shortage of funding and
turnover of licensees), an absence of inclusivity
(particularly with regard to the off-licence
trade), poor integration with other local
initiatives, and a failure to monitor, evaluate
and improve schemes.
Nonetheless, the Pubwatch schemes are
becoming more closely integrated with other
local strategies and more subject to evaluation.
Increasingly, with the creation of Crime and
Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and
Safer Communities Partnerships at local level,
the on-licensed trade has been incorporated on
local bodies. According to BBPA, over 200
industry personnel now sit on CDRPs
(interview data). Meanwhile, BII and BEDA
have also encouraged their members to join
local partnerships.
Other forums exist at local level. In various
parts of England and Wales, one can find non-
statutory liaison groups on licensing matters,
which involve a range of stakeholders. In
Scotland, licensing forums – which include
representatives of licensees, police, local
residents, and health, education and social
services – are statutory and will review the
operation of licensing law and advise licensing
boards.
Meanwhile, the Alcohol Education and
Research Council (AERC) part-funded three
community alcohol harm reduction initiatives,
which became known as the UK community
alcohol prevention programme (UKCAPP – see
Mistral et al., 2006). These projects, based in
Cardiff, Birmingham and Glasgow use multi-
agency partnerships to influence local alcohol
policies, in an effort to shape the drinking
environment and reduce alcohol problems (for
example by improving law enforcement or the
training of bar staff).
There are many other examples where local
agencies have joined together to combat alcohol
problems, particularly those related to crime and
disorder. The ‘TASC’ (Tackling Alcohol-related
Street Crime) project, funded by the Home
Office, attempted to address alcohol problems in
Cardiff through a multi-agency approach. One of
the positive outcomes was a closer and more co-
operative working relationship with the local
licensed trade (Maguire and Nettleton, 2003, p.
17). Another project that received much attention
is Manchester City Centre Safe (Brown and
Greenacre, 2005). This partnership initiative was
aimed at the growing night-time economy and
involved the police working closely with the
licensed trade, business and local government.
The scheme aimed to reduce serious assaults,
promote safe drinking and reduce perceptions of
drunkenness and disorder. Strategies included
structured ‘multi-agency’ visits to licensed
premises, safety-glass requirements, server
training, a clampdown on irresponsible
promotions, identifying the top ten worst
establishments and awards for socially
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responsible practice (‘best bar’ awards), use of an
alcohol by-law to prevent street drinking,
targeting ‘hot spots’, support and information
networks for licensees, advice on how to cope
with disorder and improvements in late-night
transport. The introduction of the project was
followed by a reported reduction in serious
assaults. These schemes – and other ‘flagship’
projects such as ‘Nightsafe’ (a scheme focused on
improved standards of retailing, pioneered by
West Lancashire Police and now being
implemented in other towns and cities including
Gloucester, Ipswich, Oxford and Cheltenham and
counties such as Norfolk and Bedfordshire) –
have been endorsed by the drinks industry,
police and local authorities. Where projects have
been evaluated, they appear to have curbed
alcohol-related crime and disorder. However, as
several interviewees observed, it is crucial that
the lessons from the schemes are carefully
analysed and widely disseminated.
Partnership can also take the form of ad hoc
co-operation between companies and/or
industry bodies and others, such as a
government department, professional group or
voluntary organisation. Many examples were
found by this study and it is possible to mention
only a few for purposes of illustration. The
Portman Group, for example, has worked
jointly with the Department for Transport on
drink-driving issues. BII has engaged with the
police, the Home Office, local authorities and
LACORS (the local authorities co-ordinators of
regulatory services) on its training programmes.
The British Retail Consortium has worked with
the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
and the Local Government Association on
licensing and public order issues. Individual
companies have also been active in establishing
working partnerships. For example, Scottish
and Newcastle graduate trainees have
undertaken projects with the charity Turning
Point. Meanwhile, Diageo has collaborated with
the National Union of Students on a national
campaign to promote responsible drinking. This
involves campaign materials in student union
bars (including beer mats, unit stickers for
glasses and bar staff T-shirts). Finally, Coors
worked closely with the Scottish Executive and
Alcohol Focus Scotland to ensure that their own
‘sensible drinking’ campaign – which involved
sporting figures from soccer clubs sponsored by
the Carling brand – complemented existing
campaigns in this field.
It is difficult to form a judgement about such
diverse activities. Industry respondents were
very enthusiastic about these and other specific
projects. Many non-industry participants also
applauded these initiatives. Others from outside
the industry, while not criticising specific
projects, expressed general concerns that the
industry’s approach could be construed as a
‘public relations’ exercise. Fears were also
expressed that ad hoc partnerships could be
used to exert undue influence over the
voluntary sector. However, it was recognised
that such fears are easier to dispel where
partnership initiatives are based on clear
agreements between participants, where they
are subject to proper independent evaluation,
and where the lessons from successful and
unsuccessful partnerships are widely shared.
At the international level, the industry has
attempted to draw up framework principles on
partnership. The Dublin Principles, mentioned
earlier in the context of research, also cover co-
operation among industry, Government, the
community and public health advocates
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(National College of Ireland, 1997). These, like
the research principles, are fairly general. In
2000, these were taken forward in the ‘Geneva
Partnership’, also an ICAP initiative, which set
out an agenda for partnership working by
highlighting common ground and outlining the
responsibilities of various stakeholders. There
have also been attempts to identify the degree of
consensus on various policy issues among the
different stakeholders (see EPC, 2006). But what
is really needed is a full and public debate about
the proper role of the industry as a partner, and
clarification of the rules of engagement with the
industry, including any safeguards that might
be needed to protect the public interest.
Conclusions
• In the traditionally adversarial world of
alcohol politics, partnership with industry
can create tensions. On a positive note, the
industry can bring resources as well as
expertise (from the producers’ knowledge of
marketing and drinking patterns to the local
‘street knowledge’ of Pubwatch schemes). To
refuse to have any input from the industry
would cut off a potential source of resources
and expertise. To exclude it from
partnerships as a matter of principle would
be short-sighted.
• The industry’s commercial objectives can
conflict with the public interest. This places
limits to what it is able to do in the context of
partnerships. The best way forward is to
establish a coherent framework, which
clarifies the scope and purpose of
partnerships and which protects weaker
participants and the public interest. This
might include a national alcohol forum
involving all stakeholders, including the
industry.
• The industry must be engaged where it
makes a genuine contribution to the
reduction of alcohol problems. One such area
is local retailing schemes, such as Pubwatch
and other locally based alcohol partnership
arrangements and projects mentioned above.
There is already evidence from ‘flagship’
projects to suggest that partnership with the
industry can bring benefits. However, there
needs to be a comprehensive review of the
impact of such schemes and widespread
dissemination of the lessons they hold, which
could be reflected in future guidance and
monitoring of partnership arrangements.
• There needs to be a full and open debate
about the role of the drinks industry in the
governance of alcohol, including
partnerships.
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Although the drinks industry remains central to
the government’s alcohol strategy, the details of
this policy have changed considerably. In some
respects, the Government’s policy appears to
have hardened against the industry (for
example, alcohol disorder zones). Elsewhere it
has sought compromise with the industry (for
example, on the national standards and the
national alcohol fund).
It is important that policies be properly
evaluated. Further research must therefore
include an independent evaluation of the
impact of:
• the national standards
• the new Drinkaware Trust
• when implemented, alcohol disorder
zones.
The drinks industry
The drinks industry has not ignored alcohol
problems. But it has taken a particular view of
them, focusing strongly on individual
responsibility, and emphasising the role of
education and research. It has accepted that
existing commitments to social responsibility
must be strengthened across the industry. It
remains wedded to education and research as
the principal instruments of prevention, while
acknowledging that self-regulation and
participation in partnership arrangements with
Government and other stakeholders may help
to prevent alcohol problems. However, it is
opposed to policies aimed at regulating overall
levels of alcohol consumption in society.
The industry is not a monolith. It presents a
united front in public, despite private
disagreements between different sectors and
between traditional corporations and ‘new
entrants’. Competitive pressures within the
industry are strong and can operate against
social responsibility. There is also a danger that
social responsibility can be wrongly construed
as anti-competitive behaviour. The industry’s
response to alcohol problems depends heavily
on the willingness and ability of the larger
companies, particularly the providers, to lead a
diverse and dynamic sector.
Critics view much of the drink industry’s
efforts as tokenism. Even so, most acknowledge
that the industry has a role to play in reducing
alcohol problems and could do more, especially
in changing marketing practices, improving
product development and shaping the drinking
environment. Critics remain concerned about
the economic and political power of the
industry and its influence over policy, and are
highly critical of the Portman Group, believing
that its regulatory and educational functions
should be transferred to an independent body.
The creation of the Drinkaware Trust will
remove most of the Portman Group’s
educational functions.
Although this study has shed some light on
the industry and its activities, further research is
needed, including:
• an examination of the facilitators and
barriers to socially responsible practice
within the contemporary drinks industry
• an investigation of the relationships
between the different sectors of the
industry on social responsibility issues, in
particular between the on- and off-trade,
and between the traditional producer
6 Conclusions
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enterprises and the ‘new entrants’,
including niche producers and pubcos
• a study of the influence of the drinks
industry within the policy process,
including its relationships with
Government, Parliament and the media.
Education and research
The drinks industry has supported education
and research as a means of preventing alcohol-
related harm. Education initiatives have
expanded beyond the problems of drink-driving
and under-age drinking to issues such as
drunkenness, binge drinking and responsible
drinking. The provision of education has also
extended beyond public campaigns and the
provision of school-based materials to web-
based sources and information on products and
in marketing. Critics of the industry believe that
education can work as part of a broader
strategy, but is relatively ineffective on its own.
Some respondents were critical about the drink
industry’s role in education and believed that it
could do more to promote responsible drinking.
The alcohol industry’s support for alcohol
research takes a variety of forms including
direct funding and indirect funding through
research boards on which the industry is
represented. Critics are concerned about the
possible manipulation of research agendas and
project findings by the industry. They saw it as
important that research, particularly when
industry-funded, is governed in a way that
explicitly protects the independence of
researchers.
Further research is needed in the following
areas.
• The impact of alcohol education
campaigns, including those that are part
of a broader programme of action on
alcohol problems, must be
comprehensively studied. This evidence
must be used to inform future campaigns.
• An investigation of different models of
research governance in the alcohol field is
needed with a view to producing clearer
criteria for future research activities,
including those funded by the industry,
government and non-governmental
organisations.
Self-regulation
Many observers, including those outside the
industry, accept that self-regulation has some
role to play in preventing alcohol misuse. An
element of self-regulation can support statutory
regulation and respond flexibly with problems
as they arise. However, despite some good
practice, several shortcomings have been
identified. There are weaknesses in enforcement
and implementation, limited independent input
and public accountability, and a lack of
comprehensive coverage, leaving important
areas under-regulated. Moreover, some
operators – often the least responsible – lie
outside self-regulatory schemes, undermining
their effectiveness. The schemes rely heavily on
‘name and shame’ or bad publicity. There is a
bewildering array of self-regulatory systems.
Moreover, there is confusion about how the
various codes relate to each other,
notwithstanding recent efforts to create a single
set of standards for the industry. There are
emerging areas of co-regulation but these
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require a stronger framework in England, where
the self-regulatory elements are weakly
underpinned by statutory law and official
guidance. There are possible lessons to be
learned from Scotland where new statutory
provisions will give stronger support to self-
regulatory activities (on training, for example).
Statutory regulation could also bolster self-
regulation by clarifying the position on
competition law with regard to socially
responsible practice in areas such as point of
sale promotions and other efforts to improve
standards down the supply chain.
Further research in this area should include
the following.
• An assessment of the overall impact of
self-regulation, particularly with regard to
advertising, marketing and promotion,
the drinking environment, under-age
drinking and training. The effect of the
different approaches to regulating point
of sale promotions in England and Wales
compared with Scotland (and the Irish
Republic) is worthy of analysis. It would
also be interesting to compare the
outcomes of different regulatory systems
for marketing and promotion that have
an element of self-regulation, such as
those operating in the UK, Australia, the
USA and New Zealand.
• Given the potential for training schemes
to underpin self-regulation and statutory
regulation, more research is needed into
the impact of different training schemes
and how they support self-regulation and
law enforcement.
• As one of the potential barriers to
effective self-regulation is the competitive
nature of the drinks business
environment, there must be further
analysis of the relationship between
market conditions and competition,
management strategies and processes,
and regulatory compliance with both self-
regulation and statutory regimes.
Furthermore, the impact of contractual
arrangements to promote social
responsibility within the industry
requires evaluation. There should also be
a closer examination of the practices of
the so-called ‘rogues and cowboys’ in the
industry, how they operate and how they
could be more effectively regulated.
Partnership
There is clearly scope for partnership working in
this field. But partnerships must be inclusive and
accountable, and must operate within a clear
framework. At national and local level, a much
more robust framework for partnerships is
needed. Government has a lead role to play in
setting this framework, and in protecting weaker
organisations and the wider public interest. This
might include a national alcohol forum involving
all stakeholders, including the industry. The
drinks industry has a legitimate role to play in
partnerships given its knowledge, resources and
expertise. It can also help to secure industry-wide
co-operation with various interventions and
initiatives. To exclude it as a matter of principle
would be short-sighted. However, there are
dangers of allowing the industry to lead or
dominate partnerships. The profit motive is
strong and not necessarily in the public interest.
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There needs to be a full, open and public debate
on the role of the alcoholic drinks industry in the
governance of alcohol, including partnerships.
This must cover issues such as the industry’s role
in education and information campaigns,
research and other activities.
Further research in this area should include
the following.
• Flagship partnership projects receive
much attention and many have been
shown to be effective, at least in the short
term. What is needed is a comprehensive
review of partnership working to confirm
what works and where more action is
needed. This could then be reflected in
the dissemination of the lessons of
partnership, and in future guidance and
monitoring of partnership arrangements.
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